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I. INTRODUCTION

Continuing a trend, 1998 included a number of important developments
in the area of professional responsibility law in Florida.' Significant
appellate court decisions, rule changes, 2 and disciplinary actions potentially
3
affect the practices of more than 58,000 members of The Florida Bar.
This article reports and summarizes those developments by placing
them in the framework of the various relationships in which lawyers
typically operate.4 Part II looks at decisions affecting what must be viewed
as the central relationship in this context: the relationship between lawyer
and client. Part III examines developments pertaining to what may be the
dominant relationship: the lawyer's relationship with the court and the
Associate Dean of Information Resources and Technology and Associate
Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida. B.S., 1977, Florida
State University; J.D., 1984, University of Texas; M.L.S., 1996, Florida State University.
** Florida Bar Ethics Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., 1987, University of
Florida; J.D., 1990, University of Florida. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance and professionalism of Kelly J. Wright.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July
15, 1997, through July 14, 1998.
*

2.

Of primary interest here are changes to the FloridaRules of ProfessionalConduct

("RPC"), which comprise Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
3.
Florida has a unified bar. Therefore, in order to regularly practice law in the state,
lawyers must be admitted to, and thus be members of, The Florida Bar. See RPC 1-3.1;
Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
4.
Cases and ethics opinions are discussed in the section to which they have the most
significant connection.
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judicial system. Part IV reviews the lawyer's relationship with third parties.
Part V deals with the lawyer's relationship with disciplinary authorities,
particularly The Florida Bar.
I. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS

The relationship between lawyer and client contains a variety of ethical
dimensions. These include: the 1) establishment of the relationship; 2)
scope of authority and representation; 3) confidentiality; 4) handling of
property relating to clients; 5) conflicts of interest; 6) fees; and 7) legal
duties owed to clients as they relate to professional ethics. Decisions in
1998 addressed these issues.
A lawyer is a client's agent and advocate, but there are ethical limits on
the scope of actions that lawyers may take on behalf of their clients.
Exceeding these limits resulted in the dismissal of an appeal and an
imposition of monetary sanctions on the lawyer in Wood-Cohan v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America.5 The trial court below granted a
directed verdict to the plaintiff's claims, but the judgment was not final
because the defendants' counterclaim was still pending.6 Nevertheless,
plaintiffs counsel filed a notice of appeal. In error, the trial court signed the
proposed final judgments submitted by the plaintiff.7 Plaintiffs counsel
then filed the judgments with the appellate court.8 When the trial court
rescinded the erroneous judgments, the lawyer failed to properly notify the
appellate court.9 Furthermore the lawyer vigorously opposed defendants'
motion to dismiss the appeal.1° In granting the motion and sanctioning the
lawyer, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declared that he had violated
both RPC 4-3.1 and 4-3.2 of the FloridaRules of ProfessionalConduct.1 1
5.
715 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
6.
Id.at 1000.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. Wood-Cohan, 715 So. 2d at 1001.
11. Id. at 1001. RPC 4-3.1, "MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS,"
provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.
RPC 4-3.1.
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In the lawyer-client relationship, it is axiomatic that lawyers, as agents,
draw their authority from clients. This principle is reflected in the Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct.
The First District Court of Appeal
considered this issue in Davis v. Meeks.13 Meeks sued Davis for injuries
resulting from an auto accident and obtained a judgment of more than $1.8
million. Subsequently, Davis sued her insurer in a Georgia state court for
bad faith. She was represented in the Georgia action, and in a malpractice
claim against her counsel in the original case, by attorney Levin. In the
Georgia proceedings, Levin authorized the insurer's counsel to move for
relief from the $1.8 million judgment. Florida attorneys Henry M. Coxe and
Michael I. Coulson filed the motion. The trial court
denied the motion and
14
Coxe and Coulson filed an appeal of that decision.
Levin noticed his appearance in the matter and filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal of the appeal. Coxe and Coulson responded by moving
to strike the notice of dismissal and to disqualify Levin. Levin's response
included an affidavit from Davis indicating her wish to have Levin represent
her interests. In denying the motions to strike the notice of voluntary
dismissal and to disqualify Levin, the court reaffirmed the basic principles
that lawyers act through the authorization of their clients and the clients
decide who will represent them:
Under these circumstances, determining who best represents [the
client's] interests in this case is not the province of this court, but
rather of [the client] herself.... The wisdom of her choice is not
RPC 4-3.2, 'EXPEDITING LITIGATION," requires reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation and provides that: "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client." RPC 4-3.2.
12. Subdivisions (a) and (c)
of RPC 4-1.2, "SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION,"
provide:
(a) Lawyer to Abide by Client's Decisions. A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to
subdivisions (c), (d), and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to make or accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal
case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether
the client will testify.
(c) Limitation of Objectives of Representation. A lawyer may limit the
objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.
RPC 4-1.2(a), (c).
13. 709 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
14. Id. at 184-85.
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for us to decide, and the consequences of that choice
present issues
15
for resolution in another forum on another day.
The lawyer-client relationship is a unique one that is grounded on
agency principles, as well as fiduciary and ethical principles. The Supreme
6
Court of Florida recognized this in Forgionev. Dennis PirtleAgency, Inc.1
In response to a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit, the supreme
court held that a negligence claim by an insured against the insurance agent
(for failure to obtain proper coverage) is assignable. 17 In contrast, Florida
law provides that a legal malpractice claim is not assignable.' 8 The court
explained this contrast by reviewing what it considered to be significant
distinctions between the insured-agent relationship and the lawyer-client
relationship. 19 Unlike the relationship between insured and insurance agent,
the lawyer-client relationship is a confidential relationship, 20 a "fiduciary
15. Id. at 185.
16. 701 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997).
17. Id. at 560.
18. Id. at 559.
19. Id. at 559-60.
20. RPC 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION," provides:
Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the
client.
When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal
such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to
reveal such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is
mandated or permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is
required to meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
RPC 4-1.6.
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relation[ship] of the very highest character 21 in which the lawyer owes a
duty of undivided loyalty to the client,22 and under RPC 4-1.9, a personal
relationship. 23

21. Forgione,701 So. 2d at 560. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1997). Section 90.502 of
the FloridaStatutes, "LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE," provides:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(b) A "client" is any person, public officer, corporation, association, or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who consults a lawyer with the
purpose of obtaining legal services or who is rendered legal services by a
lawyer.
(c) A communication between lawyer and client is "confidential" if it is not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than:
1. Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal
services to the client.
2. Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication.
(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other
person from disclosing, the contents of confidential communications when
such other person learned of the communications because they were made in
the rendition of legal services to the client.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The client.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the client.
(c) The personal representative of a deceased client.
(d) A successor, assignee, trustee in dissolution, or any similar representative
of an organization, corporation, or association or other entity, either public or
private, whether or not in existence.
(e) The lawyer, but only on behalf of the client. The lawyer's authority to
claim the privilege is presumed in the absence of contrary evidence.
(4) There is no lawyer-client privilege under this section when:
(a) The services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid
anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew was a crime or
fraud.
(b) A communication is relevant to an issue between parties who claim
through the same deceased client.
(c) A communication is relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to
the client or by the client to the lawyer, arising from the lawyer-client
relationship.
(d) A communication is relevant to an issue concerning the intention or
competence of a client executing an attested document to which the lawyer is
an attesting witness, or concerning the execution or attestation of the
document.

166

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:161

(e) A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest between two
or more clients, or their successors in interest, if the communication was
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when
offered in a civil action between the clients or their successors in interest.
(5) Communications made by a person who seeks or receives services from
the Department of Revenue under the child support enforcement program to
the attorney representing the department shall be confidential and privileged
as provided for in this section. Such communications shall not be disclosed
to anyone other than the agency except as provided for in this section. Such
disclosures shall be protected as if there were an attorney-client relationship
between the attorney for the agency and the person who seeks services from
the department.
FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1997).
22. Forgione, 701 So. 2d at 560. See RPC 4-1.7, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST;
GENERAL RULE," which provides:
(a) Representing Adverse Interests. A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests of
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the lawyer's responsibilities to and relationship with the other
client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or
by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(c) Explanation to Clients. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
(d) upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.
RPC 4-1.7.
See also RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," which provides: Lawyers Related by Blood or Marriage. A lawyer
related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse shall not represent a client in a
representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other
lawyer except:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client.
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or
expenses, unless:
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(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably
understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice
of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
(h) Using Information to Disadvantage of Client. A lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client unless the client consents after consultation, except as permitted or
required by rule 4-1.6.
(c) Gifts to Lawyer or Lawyer's Family. A lawyer shall not prepare an
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child,
sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary
gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Acquiring Literary or Media Rights. Prior to the conclusion of
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement
giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in
substantial part on information relating to the representation.
(e) Financial Assistance to Client. A lawyer shall not provide financial
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,
except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
(f) Compensation by Third Party. A lawyer shall not accept compensation
for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by rule 4-1.6.
(g) Settlement of Claims for Multiple Clients. A lawyer who represents 2
or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement
as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after
consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims
or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) Limiting Liability for Malpractice. A lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement. A lawyer shall not settle a claim for
such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first
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One of the cornerstones of the lawyer-client relationship is the lawyers'
duty of confidentiality concerning all information relating to the
representation of their clients. This duty was discussed by the Supreme
Court of Florida in the disciplinary case of Florida Bar v. Lange.2 The
lawyer represented a defendant in a federal criminal case. The prosecution
listed the lawyer's former client as a witness. The lawyer filed a "Motion to
Notice Actual Potential Conflict of Interest" in which he disclosed
confidential communications previously received from his former client, the
witness. When later charged by The Florida Bar with violating the lawyerclient confidentiality under RPC 4-1.6,2 the lawyer defended by asserting
that his actions were justified by the "crime-fraud" exception to the
confidentiality rule.26 Rejecting this defense, the court explained the scope
of this portion of the rule."27 While lawyers ordinarily are required to hold in
confidence all "information relating to representation of a client," an
exception to this rule requires disclosure of confidential information to
prevent the client's commission of a crime. 28 However, the disclosure by
Lange related to crimes that had already occurred and, thus, was not
authorized by the rule.29 In a footnote, the court noted how the distinction
between the evidenciary lawyer-client privilege and the ethical duty of
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate
in connection therewith.
(i) Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Cause of Action. A lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or
expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee.
RPC 4-1.8.
23. RPC 4-1.9, "Conflict of Interest; Former Client," provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9.
24. 711 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1998).
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. Lange, 711 So. 2d at 519.
27. Id. at 519-20.
28. Id. at 519 (quoting RPC 4-1.6).
29. Id. at 520.
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confidentiality related to this case: "Even if respondent believed that no
attorney-client privilege existed under [FloridaStatutes section] 90.502, his
actions nevertheless were guided by [RPC] 4-1.6, which forbids attorneys to
disclose client confidences
unless disclosure is necessary to prevent a crime
'
from occurring. 00
A lawyer's handling of property relating to the representation of a client
can not only implicate the confidentiality rule, but other ethical principles as
well. The disagreements between lawyers and their clients often arise in
connection with a client's request to review or obtain materials from case
files, particularly after the parties terminate the representation. Florida
reported two cases on this subject in 1998.31
The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the standards relating to a
client's access to file material in Long v. Dillinger.32 Although files
maintained by lawyers on their clients' cases are commonly referred to by
the client's name, the court endorsed the position, previously expressed in
Florida case law33 and ethics opinions, 34 that "such referral simply means
that the file relates to a particular client; the file and its contents are the
personal property of the attorney. 35 In Long, a former client of the public
defender's office was represented by the capital collateral representative
("CCR"). The former client sought possession of the public defender's file
on his case. The court concluded that a public defender's file on a client is
the property of the public defender. 6 The court further concluded, however,
that the public defender must allow CCR to view the file and must provide,
"for adequate compensation, copies of all useful information contained in
the file.",' The supreme court echoed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
view that "under certain circumstances, an ethical duty may exist to
communicate information regarding a case to a successor counsel. 35
30.

Id. at 520 n. 2.

31.

See Guetzloe v. Hartley, 710 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Marcus

v. Sullivan, 701 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
32. 701 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1997).
33. See, e.g., Woodson v. Durocher, 588 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Dowda & Fields v. Cobb, 452 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
34. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-11 (1993)
(Reconsideration); Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-11 (1988); Fla. Bar Comm.

on Professional Ethics, Op. 71-57 (1971); Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 71-57
(1971).
35. Long, 701 So. 2d at 1169 (citing Dowda & Fields v. Cobb, 452 So. 2d 1140, 1142
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).

36.
37.

Id.
Id.

38.

Id.
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Finally, the court noted that any transcripts or records that the public
defender prepared at the public's
39 expense should be surrendered to CCR for
the former client at no charge.
This latter proposition was central to the Fifth District Court of
Appeal's decision in McCaskill v. Dees. The former client of a courtappointed private lawyer sought a writ of mandamus to compel counsel to
furnish him with certain materials from the file, including depositions and
witness statements. The court held that, in this situation, mandamus would
lie to compel the lawyer to furnish the requested documents. 4' In support of
its decision, the court cited two cases deciding that, as an exception to the
general rule reiterated in Long42 regarding lawyer ownership of the case file,
documents prepared at public expense must always be furnished by courtappointed counsel to their clients.43 The court also referred to RPC 4-1.16
(d).44
Fees charged by lawyers are often the topic of litigation, and 1998
included its share of cases in this sensitive area. Negotiating a fee agreement
with a client presents a lawyer with a potential, but largely unavoidable,
conflict of interest. Terms favorable to the lawyer may be seen as
unfavorable from the client's point of view. The specific terms of the
agreement may, themselves, create a conflict situation. In Cole v. State,45 the
lawyer-client employment agreement in a felony criminal case provided that
the flat fee paid by the client would include all discovery and investigative
fees, as well as the fee for the lawyer's services. 46 The court noted that an
"inherent conflict" was presented because the arrangement provided that the
out-of-pocket discovery and investigative costs came from the lawyer's
39. Id.
40. 698 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
41. Id. at 628.
42. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
43. McCaskill, 698 So. 2d at 628 (citing Bermed v. Tacher, 565 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990). See also Dubose v. Shelnutt, 566 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
44. McCaskill, 698 So. 2d at 628. (citing RPC 4-1.16(d)). Subdivision (d) of RPC 41.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION," provides:
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not
been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or
belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
RPC 4-1.16(d).
45. 700 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
46. Id. at 37.
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pocket rather than from the client's. 47 Although not discussed by the court,
this type of fee agreement, if not structured properly, could also violate the
lawyer trust accounting rules. 48
Fee related conflict issues also are presented when a client's fee is paid
by a third party.49 Marcus v. Sullivan50 was a civil case concerning a
promissory note for a client's legal fees executed by the client's girlfriend. 5'
She was not represented by independent counsel in making the note. When
the lawyer sued on the note, the girlfriend defended by asserting that she
signed it under duress. The trial judge agreed, finding that a conflict existed
due to the circumstances and relationships involved and that, as a result, the
lawyer should have advised the client's girlfriend to have independent
counsel regarding signing the promissory note. 52 The trial court held that
duress was present and declared the note to be unenforceable.53 The
appellate court reversed, stating that it was "aware of no law that an attorney
need require the payee of a note to secure counsel prior to signing a note to

47. Id. The conflict was particularly pronounced, and deception appeared to be
present, in view of the lawyer's stated "policy" of not conducting discovery in these types of
cases. Id.
48. See Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 93-2 (1993).
49. Subdivision (f) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(f) Compensation by Third Party. A lawyer shall not accept compensation
for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by RPC 4-1.6.
RPC 4-1.8(0.
50. 701 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
51. Id. at 660.
52. Id. at 662 (citing RPC 4-4.3).
RPC 4-4.3, "DEALING WITH
UNREPRESENTED PERSONS," provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
RPC 4-4.3.
53. Marcus, 701 So. 2d at 662.
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secure the legal fees of another., 54 The trial court's legal conclusion of
duress was deemed incorrect.55
In addition to maintaining sensitivity to ethical questions of conflicts
and legal issues such as duress in the making of fee contracts, Florida
lawyers must adhere to the specific provisions of the rule that regulate first
party fee agreements and payments. Decisions in the past year continued the
recent trend of requiring strict adherence to these rules in the civil, as well as
in the disciplinary, context. 56 Guetzloe v. Hartley57 concerned lawyers who
had defended a client in a replevin action and had filed counterclaims on the
client's behalf for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and several torts
(including assault).5 8 The original lawyer-client fee agreement provided for
payment of an hourly fee plus a percentage of any recovery obtained for the
client. When the client became seriously delinquent in his hourly fee
obligations, the parties renegotiated the fee agreement.
The client still did
59
not pay the fees charged, and the firm sued to collect.
One of the defenses raised by the client was the lawyer's alleged
noncompliance with RPC 4-1.5. 60 This rule contains ethical regulations
54.

55.

Id. at 663.
Id. at 662.

56. See, e.g., Foodtown Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding oral contingent fee agreements that do not comply with ethics rules governing
contingent fee contracts cannot be considered by a court in determining fees recoverable under
the Florida Fee-Shifting Statute); Florida Bar v. Rubin, 709 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1998) (holding
discipline warranted against lawyer who filed a complaint against another lawyer on alleged
verbal referral fee agreement which did not comply with ethics rules); Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995) (holding contingent fee agreements that do not comply
with the Code of Professional Responsibility or Rules Regulating The Florida Bar are not
enforceable by an attorney who claims fees based upon a noncomplying agreement). See also
infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
57. 710 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
58. Id. at 1044.
59. Id. at 1044-45.
60. Subdivision (f) of RPC4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(f) Contingent Fees. As to contingent fees:
(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited
by paragraph (0(3) or by law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing
and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial, or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from
the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after
the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter,
the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the
outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to
the client and the method of its determination.
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(2) Every lawyer who accepts a retainer or enters into an agreement,
express or implied, for compensation for services rendered or to be rendered
in any action, claim, or proceeding whereby the lawyer's compensation is to
be dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the successful
prosecution or settlement thereof shall do so only where such fee arrangement
is reduced to a written contract, signed by the client, and by a lawyer for the
lawyer or for the law firm representing the client. No lawyer or firm may
participate in the fee without the consent of the client in writing. Each
participating lawyer or law firm shall sign the contract with the client and
shall agree to assume joint legal responsibility to the client for the
performance of the services in question as if each were partners of the other
lawyer or law firm involved. The client shall be furnished with a copy of the
signed contract and any subsequent notices or consents. All provisions of
this rule shall apply to such fee contracts.
(3) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(A) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount
of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of
alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(B) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case.
(4) A lawyer who enters into an arrangement for, charges, or collects
any fee in an action or claim for personal injury or for property damages or
for death or loss of services resulting from personal injuries based upon
tortious conduct of another, including products liability claims, whereby the
compensation is to be dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the
successful prosecution or settlement thereof shall do so only under the
following requirements:
(A) The contract shall contain the following provisions:
(i) The undersigned client has, before signing this contract,
received and read the statement of client's rights and understands each of the
rights set forth therein. The undersigned client has signed the statement and
received a signed copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned
attorney(s).
(ii) This contract may be cancelled by written notification
to the attorney at any time within 3 business days of the date the contract was
signed, as shown below, and if cancelled the client shall not be obligated to
pay any fees to the attorney for the work performed during that time. If the
attorney has advanced funds to others in representation of the client, the
attorney is entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts as the attorney has
reasonably advanced on behalf of the client.
(B) The contract for representation of a client in a matter set forth
in subdivision (0(4) may provide for a contingent fee arrangement as agreed
upon by the client and the lawyer, except as limited by the following
provisions:
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(i) Without prior court approval as specified below, any
contingent fee that exceeds the following standards shall be presumed, unless
rebutted, to be clearly excessive:
a. Before the filing of an answer or the demand for
appointment of arbitrators or, if no answer is filed or no demand for
appointment of arbitrators is made, the expiration of the time period provided
for such action:
1. 33 1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1
million and $2 million; plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2
million.
b. After the filing of an answer or the demand for
appointment of arbitrators or, if no answer is filed or no demand for
appointment of arbitrators is made, the expiration of the time period provided
for such action, through the entry of judgment:
1. 40% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1
million and $2 million; plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2
million.
c. If all defendants admit liability at the time of filing
their answers and request a trial only on damages:
1. 33 1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 20% of any portion of the recovery between $1
million and $2 million; plus
3. 15% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2
million.
d. An additional 5% of any recovery after notice of
appeal is filed or post-judgment relief or action is required for recovery on the
judgment.
(ii) If any client is unable to obtain an attorney of the
client's choice because of the limitations set forth in (f)(4)(B)(i), the client
may petition the circuit court for approval of any fee contract between the
client and an attorney of the client's choosing. Such authorization shall be
given if the court determines the client has a complete understanding of the
client's rights and the terms of the proposed contract. The application for
authorization of such a contract can be filed as a separate proceeding before
suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Proceedings thereon
may occur before service on the defendant and this aspect of the file may be
sealed. Authorization of such a contract shall not bar subsequent inquiry as
to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive under
subdivisions (a) and (b).
(iii) In cases where the client is to receive a recovery that
will be paid to the client on a future structured or periodic basis, the
contingent fee percentage shall only be calculated on the cost of the
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structured verdict or settlement or, if the cost is unknown, on the present
money value of the structured verdict or settlement, whichever is less. If the
damages and the fee are to be paid out over the long term future schedule,
then this limitation does not apply. No attorney may separately negotiate
with the defendant for that attorney's fee in a structured verdict or settlement
where such separate negotiations would place the attorney in a position of
conflict.
(C) Before a lawyer enters into a contingent fee contract for
representation of a client in a matter set forth in this rule, the lawyer shall
provide the client with a copy of the statement of client's rights and shall
afford the client a full and complete opportunity to understand each of the
rights as set forth therein. A copy of the statement, signed by both the client
and the lawyer, shall be given to the client to retain and the lawyer shall keep
a copy in the client's file. The statement shall be retained by the lawyer with
the written fee contract and closing statement under the same conditions and
requirements as subdivision (0(5).
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee
within subdivision (0(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any
fee.in excess of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in
which 2 or more lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active
participation in the providing of legal services. In such circumstances
counsel shall apply for circuit court authorization of the fee division in excess
of 25%, based upon a sworn petition signed by all counsel that shall disclose
in detail those services to be performed. The application for authorization of
such a contract may be filed as a separate proceeding before suit or
simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Proceedings thereon may occur
before service of process on any party and this aspect of the file may be
sealed. Authorization of such contract shall not bar subsequent inquiry as to
whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive. An
application under this subdivision shall contain a certificate showing service
on the client and The Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with representation
of the client pending court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be
applicable after deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained
especially for appellate purposes.
(5) In the event there is a recovery, upon the conclusion of the
representation, the lawyer shall prepare a closing statement reflecting an
itemization of all costs and expenses, together with the amount of fee
received by each participating lawyer or law firm. A copy of the closing
statement shall be executed by all participating lawyers, as well as the client,

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:161

governing all fees charged or collected by lawyers. 61 The rule includes both
provisions generally applicable to contingent fees and additional, detailed
regulations (e.g., a maximum fee schedule, a requirement that attorneys
furnish clients written "Statements of Client's Rights") that apply to
contingent fees for claims involving "personal injury or for property
damages or for death or loss of services resulting from personal injuries
based uon tortious conduct of another, including products liability
claims." The client asserted that the lawyers' failure to provide him with
the "Statement of Client's Rights" violated RPC 4-1.5 and, thus, rendered
the entire fee agreement void and unenforceable. Rejecting this contention,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that the client's tort claims arose in
the context of the replevin case, which was a commercial action. 63 The
comment to RPC 4-1.5 expressly states that the provisions of the rule
governing contingent fees in personal injury type tort cases "should not be
construed to apply to actions or claims seeking
property or other damages
64
arising in the commercial litigation context."
The failure to observe the requirements of the ethics rules for fee
divisions, in the referral fee situation, led to the imposition of discipline
in Florida Bar v. Rubin.65 Lawyer Rubin filed a grievance complaint with
The Florida Bar, alleging that another lawyer had acted unethically by
failing to pay him an allegedly agreed upon referral fee in a contingent fee
matter. Rubin sued the other lawyer for the fee. Turning the tables, the Bar
filed disciplinary charges against Rubin. 66 RPC 4-1.5(f)(2) requires that
every lawyer or law firm who participates in a contingent fee sign the
contract with the client.67 Rubin had not signed the contract in the case in
question. The Supreme Court of Florida ordered him publicly reprimanded,
explaining:

and each shall receive a copy. Each participating lawyer shall retain a copy of
the written fee contract and closing statement for 6 years after execution of
the closing statement. Any contingent fee contract and closing statement
shall be available for inspection at reasonable times by the client, by any
other person upon judicial order, or by the appropriate disciplinary agency.
RPC 4-1.5(f).
61. Id.at 4-1.5(f)(4)(B).
62. Id.at 4-1.5(f).
63. Guetzloe, 710 So. 2d at 1045.
64. Id.(RPC 4-1.5(f)).
64. Id.at 4-1.5(f)(4)(B).
64. Id. at 4-1.5(f).
64. Guetzloe, 710 So. 2d at 1045 (quoting RPC 4-1.5 cmt.).
65. 709 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1998).
66. Id.at 1362.
67. RPC 4-1.5(f(2). See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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This Court expects strict compliance with this rule and similar rules
requiring a client's written consent to an attorney's fee regardless
of the circumstances involved. These requirements must be
diligently adhered to and enforced in order to avoid the
troublesome situation which arose in this case and, more
68
importantly, to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.

In not complying with the rule requiring a written fee agreement,
negative consequences arose for the lawyer in D.H. Blair & Co. v.
Johnson.69 A National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
arbitration panel awarded the claimants damages.7 0 Moreover, the panel also
awarded attorneys' fees in an amount to be determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction. 71 The trial court determined and awarded the amount
of fees for the work of two lawyers, Tepper and Weissman.72 On appeal, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal overturned the award of attorneys' fees on
an issue of law.73 Additionally, however, the court concluded that the award
of fees for Weissman's work was improper because he had not signed the fee
agreement with the clients, as required by RPC 4-1.5(f)(2). 74 Interestingly,
the court's opinion
did not cite Chandris,S.A. v. Yanakakis.7 5
S•
76
Noris v. Silver was a case in which a Florida court cited and discussed
Chandris. 7 Client Noris sued lawyer Silver for legal malpractice and
negligent referral. Noris alleged that he was injured while visiting another
state. He contacted Silver, who referred him to lawyer Falk. In the past,
Silver had referred clients to Falk and received a share of Falk's fee. Noris
68. Rubin, 709 So. 2d at 1364 (citing Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180
(Fla. 1995) (holding that a contingent fee agreement is void if not in compliance with the
rules)). Regarding the import of Chandris, see Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional
Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NovA L. REv. 231, 260-65 (1996)

(hereinafter "Chinaris").
69. 697 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
70. Id. at 913.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. D.H. Blair & Co., 697 So. 2d at 914 (citing RPC 4-1.5(0(2)). See supra note 60
and accompanying text.
75. D.H. Blair & Co., 697 So. 2d at 914 (referring to Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis,
668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995)). The court, however, did cite Perez v. George, Hartz, Lundeen,
Flagg & Fulmer, 662 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), which held that a law firm not
entitled to fee where the "client" did not sign contract with firm or agree to formal affiliation
between his counsel and firm. Id.
76. 701 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (opinion on rehearing).
77. Id. at 1240-41.
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retained Falk to handle his injury claim. The Noris-Falk employment
agreement did not mention Silver, and Silver and Falk did not execute a
written fee division agreement. Falk let the statute of limitations lapse
without filing suit. Noris then sued Silver.7 s
The trial court entered an order of summary judgment for Silver on the
legal malpractice claim, and ordered the negligent referral claim dismissed.79
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment order
on the malpractice claim.80 The court concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding whether Silver had retained a financial
interest in Noris's case by expressly or impliedly agreeing to divide the legal
fee with Falk.
According to the court, this issue was material because
"pursuant to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4-1.5(g), if Falk and Silver
agreed to divide the attorney's fee, Silver would be liable for the malpractice
committed by Falk." 2 RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) allows a lawyer to receive what is
commonly called a "referral fee" - that is, a fee that one attorney receives
for referring a client to another attorney. 83 The fee is "earned" primarily as a
78. Id. at 1239.
79. Id. at 1239-40. Dismissal of the negligent referral claim was affirmed "because
Noris' claim for negligent referral did not allege that Silver had knowledge of any facts that
would indicate that Falk would commit malpractice and because Noris' counsel conceded
during oral argument that Silver had no such knowledge." Id. at 1241.
80. Noris, 701 So. 2d at 1240.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing to RPC 4-1.5(g)). The court's decision that a fee division agreement,
which apparently did not comply with the relevant ethics rule, thereby creates malpractice
liability because of that rule seems questionable. Furthermore, the Preamble to the RPC states
that breach of the rule "should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been breached." RPC preamble. The court acknowledged
the existence of this language, but did not consider it controlling in light of the reasoning
underlying the supreme court's decision in Chandris. Noris, 701 So. 2d at 1240.
83. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer; or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the
representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be
made and the basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5(g).
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct (effective Jan. 1, 1987), the
ethics rules did not permit division of fees among attorneys in different firms except on the
basis of work performed. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107
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result of the referral, rather than from any work performed on the case by the
referring attorney.
The Third District Court of Appeal noted that, pursuant to Chandris,
Silver could not have enforced an oral fee division against Falk. 4
Nevertheless, the court believed that noncompliance with the governing
ethics rule should not be allowed to shield a lawyer from the responsibilities
and liabilities that the court believed the rule imposes.8 5 However, believing
this issue to be one of great
86 public importance, the court certified it to the
Supreme Court of Florida.
Another important case in which a Florida court cited Chandrisis King
v. Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf P.A..87 Central to this case was the
applicability of RPC 4-1.5(f)(3)(A), which prohibits lawyers from charging
or collecting a contingent fee "in a domestic relations matter, the payment or
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the
amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof." 88 In
King a man retained a law firm to represent him in a dissolution of marriage

case.

9

The written fee agreement provided for a $25,000 nonrefundable

retainer, set hourly rates for the firm's lawyers (ranging from $165 to $325),
and provided for a payment of a "bonus" fee at the conclusion of the case.

(1986). Thus, the rules did not permit referral fees. In adopting the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Supreme Court of Florida permitted referral fees, subject to certain regulations
(i.e., written agreement signed by all participating attorneys and the client, in which all
attorneys accepted joint legal responsibility for the case and agreed to be available to consult
with the client). The Florida Bar re: Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla.
1986). Effective January 1, 1998, the court amended the rules to restrict the amount of the fee
which the referring attorney court receive in the absence of court approval to 25%. The
Florida Bar re: Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 519 So. 2d 971 (Fla.
1987).
84. Noris, 701 So. 2d at 1240.
85.

Id.

86. Id. at 1241.
87. 709 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
88. Id. at 573. Subdivision (f)(3) of RPC 4-1.5, '"EESFOR LEGAL SERVICES,"
provides:
(3) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(A) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of
which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of
alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(B) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
RPC 4-1.5(0(3).
89. King, 709 So. 2d at 573.
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This "bonus" fee was to be determined by "taking into consideration the
results achieved and the complexity of the matter."
The client paid the retainer fee and the firm's hourly charges. After the
case was concluded, however, the client refused to pay the $750,000 bonus
fee demanded by the firm. The firm then sued, seeking a bonus fee of
$1,150,000. The client argued, and the Third District Court of Appeal
91
agreed, that the bonus fee was contingent on the "results obtained."

90. Id. at 573 (quoting fee agreement).
91. Id. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(b) Factors to Be Considered in Determining Reasonable Fee. Factors to
be considered as guides in determining a reasonable fee include:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal
services of a comparable or similar nature;
(4) the significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the
representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the
results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances
and, as between attorney and client, any additional or special time demands or
requests of the attorney by the client;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of effort
reflected in the actual providing of such services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or
rate, then whether the client's ability to pay rested to any significant degree
on the outcome of the representation.
RPC 4-1.5(b) (emphasis added).
It can be argued that a fee based to any significant degree on the "results obtained" for
the client is, in effect, a contingent fee. Regarding the definition of "contingent fee," Florida
case law has stated that "[tihe controlling substantive character of a contingency fee
agreement is the feature that the attorney gets paid in one event and not in another."
Quanstrom v. Standard Guaranty Ins. Co., 519 So. 2d 1135, 1136 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1988), rev. on other grounds, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990). If a "results obtained" fee is indeed
a contingent fee, lawyers may not ethically charge it in most domestic relations cases or in
criminal defense cases. RPC 4-1.5(f(3). Persons who argue that the rules permit "results
obtained" fees in domestic and criminal cases point out that RPC 4-1.5(b) explicitly lists "the
results obtained" as a factor lawyers should consider in setting a reasonable fee. RPC 41.5(b)(4).
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Consequently, the court held that the bonus fee clause called for a prohibited
contingent fee, and thus was unenforceable under the holding in Chandris.9 2
Another domestic relations case involving a "results obtained" fee is
May v. Sessums & Mason, P.A.. A law firm had represented a client in a
contested dissolution matter, with a fee agreement for hourly billing as well
as a provision stating that, upon conclusion of the case, "an additional
attorney's fee may be requested" based on factors including "results
obtained. 94 The fee contract further stated that this additional fee would be
"subject to discussion and agreement with [the client] prior to such bill being
tendered. ' 95 At the end of the case, and without an agreement by the client,
the law firm billed the client for an additional $1,000,000. The client
refused to pay, the law firm sued to collect, and the firm ultimately obtained
a judgment of $564,500.96
On appeal, the client argued that the "additional fee" provision was an
unethical, unenforceable contingent fee because it was based, at least in part,
on "results obtained." 97 The Second District Court of Appeal did not reach
this question. 98 Rather, it reversed the lower court's judgment on other
grounds. 99 The client had not contracted to pay the additional fee; the
language of the contract only stated that an additional fee might be requested
by the firm.lo0 Regarding the possible effect on the public's perception of
the legal system, however, the court observed:
This is an unfortunate case for the legal profession. Regardless of
the outcome of these proceedings, this case, in all likelihood, will,
justifiably or not, cause some segments of the legal profession to
suffer further disrepute. This is particularly unfortunate because
the disputes at issue could clearly have been avoided by a more
carefully drawn document which the10 experienced attorneys
involved were fully capable of preparing. '

92. King, 709 So. 2d at 573. After voiding the noncomplying fee agreement, the
court limited the firm's quantum meruit recovery to the amount of fees already received,
$342,989. Id. at 574.
93. 700 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
94. Id. at 23-24.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id. at 23.

97.

Id. at 25.

98.
99.
100.
101.

May, 700 So. 2d at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 28.
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A third
• case on the subject
• 102of "results obtained" fees was Martin L.
Haines, III, Charteredv. Sophia. A law firm had represented a client in a
family law matter. Throughout the representation the client paid fees
charged on an hourly basis. At the conclusion of the case, the firm sought
additional fees. In the employment contract, the client had agreed that the
parties could determine the amount of fee owed in a summary proceeding to
enforce the firm's charging
lien and, consequently, the firm moved to
r3
enforce its charging lien. u
The employment agreement also provided that the firm's final fee, to be
determined at the conclusion of case, would be based on stated criteria,
which were identical to most of the "factors to be considered as guides in
determining a reasonable fee" set out in RPC 4-1.5(b) including the "results
obtained" provision.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal construed the
agreement to mean that the "entire fee will be based solely on the hours
billed, unless the client agrees later to an additional amount."105 The court
harmonized this decision with its opinion in Franklin & Marbin, P.A. v.
Mascola, °6 which ruled that the rights and duties of the parties ordinarily are
determined by the fee agreement. 10 7 The court affirmed the trial court's
judgment which held that the client owed no further fees to the law firm. 0 8
As in May, the court did not address whether the "results obtained"
provision ran afoul of the FloridaRules of ProfessionalConduct.10 9
Other cases have addressed different fee related issues. Hollub v.
Clancy' 0 was an appeal of an attorney's fee award in a commercial
dispute. 1" Appellants argued that the trial court erred by awarding fees for
time charged under an unreasonable unit billing arrangement.
The
questionable charges included, for example, twelve instances in which a
lawyer claimed one hour or more to review a one or two page document. As
a result, the Third District Court of Appeal determined the amount of fees

102. 711 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
103. Id. at 209-10.
104. Id. at 209 n.1 (citing RPC 4-1.5(b)). See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
105. Haines, 711 So. 2d at 210.
106. 711 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
107. Id. at 47.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 47 n.1.
110. 706 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
111. Id. at 16.
112. Id. at 19 (citing Browne v. Costales, 579 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (stating that "[u]nit billing is a practice where the attorney bills a predetermined number
of minutes for a given task.")). See also Nickerson v. Nickerson, 608 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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awarded to be excessive." 13 The court remanded the case with directions for
the trial court to eliminate the unreasonable unit billing amounts." 4
Another Third District Court of Appeal case, Girten v. Andreu,"5
mentioned excessive fees.' 16 The case was a paternity action in which a
major issue of contention was whether the child would bear the surname of
the mother or of the father. Paternity of the child was uncontested. The trial
court ordered the father to p ay the mother's attorney fees.' 1 7 The appellate
court affirmed this award. Il Total fees incurred by the parties exceeded
$165,000. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's description of the
total fees incurred in the case as "shocking," but found no abuse of
discretion." 9 A concurring opinion went further, declaring that the adjective
"shocking" "gravely understates the reality.'*' 2 Judge Sorondo thought that
"unconscionable" was a more accurate description. z A review of the RPC
4-1.5(a)(1), 4-1.5(b)(1) and 4-1.5(b)(4) led him to 22the conclusion that the
fees generated in the case were "grossly excessive."'
Several 1998 cases addressed various aspects of a useful fee collection
tool for lawyers, the charging lien.12 3 A lawyer's charging lien is perfected
113. Hollub, 706 So. 2d at 19.
114. Id. at 19.

115. 698 So. 2d 886 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
116. Id. at 889.
117. Id. at 888.
118. Id. at 887.
119. Id. at 888-89.
120. Girten, 698 So. 2d at 889 (Sorondo, J., concurring specially).
121. Id.
122. Id. (Jorgenson, J., concurring specially) (citing RPC 4-1.5(a)). Subdivision (a) of
RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not
enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly
excessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through
advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee
for services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or
an unconscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional
misrepresentation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as
to either entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
RPC 4-1.5(a).
123. See, e.g., Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom,
428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983) ("charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees
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by providing timely notice to the affected parties. 124 In Gaebe, Murphy,
Mullen & Antonelli v. Bradt, 25 the court addressed the question of what
constituted timely notice. 126 A law firm withdrew from representing a
plaintiff in a wrongful death action and filed a charging lien. The firm sent a
notice of the charging lien to its former client and to the lawyer for the
defendant, although the defendant's lawyer asserted that he never received it.
The firm apparently did not send a notice to the defendant's insurer. New
counsel took over the plaintiff's case and settled it. When the law firm
attempted to enforce its charging lien, the trial court allowed enforcement
against only the firm's former client, ruling that the defendant's counsel and
insurer had not received notice of the lien. 127 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, agreeing with the law firm that "the filing of the charging
lien prior to the dismissal of the case and/or entry of judgment constituted
timely notice and, thus, perfected the lien against [defense counsel and the
insurer] .128
Cohen & Cohen, P.A. v. Angrand 29 also addressed the issue of
sufficient notice of a claimed charging lien.' 30 In Angrand, a law firm
represented a client in a case involving three separate lawsuits. Eventually
the client discharged the firm without cause."" The firm then filed a
charging lien, but used the wrong case number. The court clerk noticed the
error and filed the lien in one of the cases, but not in the other. Later, when
the firm sought to enforce its charging lien, a general master ruled that the
132
typographical error rendered the lien a nullity and denied its claim of fees.
Reversing, the appellate court concluded that the lien was enforceable

due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that
particular suit"). Id.
124. Id. at 1385.
125. 704 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
126. Id. at 618.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 619.
129. 710 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
130. Id. at 166.
131. Id. at 167. A discharged lawyer's right to a fee for services performed prior to
discharge can differ greatly, depending on whether the discharge was with or without cause.
Compare Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982) (holding that a lawyer discharged
without cause was entitled to a reasonable value of services performed, limited by a maximum
contract fee), with Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Scheller, 629 So. 2d
947 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a lawyer discharged with cause was entitled to
quantum meruit value of services rendered minus the damages suffered by client as result of
the lawyer's breach of contract). See also Kushner v. Engelberg, Cantor & Leone, P.A., 699
So. 2d 850 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
132. Angrand, 710 So. 2d at 167.
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because the firm's intent was obvious and there was no claim that the firm
133
misled any of the parties or that any of the parties failed to receive notice.
In Kushner v. Engelberg, Cantor& Leone, P.A., 3 the proper method of
calculating the amount of fees due under a claimed charging lien was at
issue.1 35 In an estate matter, a personal representative discharged his lawyer
with cause. 36 Citing Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v.
Scheller,1 37 the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the
discharged lawyer was entitled to the "quantum meruit value of the services
rendered less any damages which the client incurred due to the attorney's
conduct and discharge."'
Another charging lien case concerning fee calculation was Carbonic
Consultants, Inc. v. Herzfeld & Rubin, Inc., 13 9 in which a law firm
represented a client on a contingent fee basis in an antitrust case.140 The firm
moved to withdraw from the case because the lawyer who actually was
handling the case resigned from the firm. The trial court granted the motion
to withdraw and the firm's motion for a charging lien.14 1 However, the Third
142
District Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the charging lien.
The court recited the rule, established by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Faro v. Romani, 143 that a lawyer who voluntarily withdraws from a
contingent fee case before the contingency occurs ordinarily is not entitled to
any fee. 44 An exception to this "no fee rule" occurs when the client's
conduct makes the representation legally impossible or will result in ethical
violations by the lawyer. 145
Applying the principles of Faro, the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred in granting the charging lien. 46 The firm, not
the client, created the firm's ethical problem of remaining in the case
133. Id.
134. 699 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
135. Id. at 851.

136. Id. For the distinction between a discharge with cause and a discharge without
cause for purposes of calculating fees owed, see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
137. 629 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
138. Kushner, 699 So. 2d at 851. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
139. 699 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
140. Id. at 322.
141. Id. at 323.
142. Id. at 322.
143. 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
144. Carbonic, 699 So. 2d at 323 (citing Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla.

1994)).
145. Faro, 641 So. 2d at 71.
146. Carbonic,699 So. 2d at 322.
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without the necessary subject matter expertise. The client had not engaged
in any conduct that would have made the firm's continued representation
unethical. Accordingly, the firm forfeited its right to a fee when it withdrew
from the case.147
At least one charging lien case addressed broader issues relating to fee
agreements between lawyer and client. In Franklin & Marbin, P.A. v.
Mascola, 4 8 a client in a paternity case hired a law firm and entered into a fee
contract providing, inter alia, that the client would: 1) pay the firm a
"reasonable attorney's fee against which [the firm] will bill [the client] in
accordance with our established hourly rates;" and 2) read all billing
statements and notify the firm in writing within fifteen days of any
objections, with failure to do so presumed to be agreement with the
"correctness, accuracy and fairness" of the bill. 149 Prior to conclusion of the
case, the firm withdrew and filed a notice of charging lien. Evidence
adduced by the firm in support of its claim of lien included unobjected to
bills sent to the client totaling more than $19,000. The trial court entered
judgment for the firm, but in the amount of only $6800. 50
The law firm appealed, contending that the trial court erred because the
fee contract, in particular, the provision waiving client objections to the bill
if not presented within fifteen days, was controlling 5 1 The client, on the
other hand, argued that the court should uphold the judgment because the
law required the court only 5to2 award a reasonable fee, as opposed to the fee
the law firm actually billed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion reviewed Florida law
concerning client liability to his or her lawyer under various
circumstances. 53 Relying on cases concluding that the lodestar formula of
154
Florida
Fund
v. Rowe client,
is as
inapplicable
to 4-a
lawyer's Patients
claim for Compensation
fees directly from
the lawyer's
well as RPC

147. Id. at 321. The fact that the firm procured an informal advisory opinion from the
staff of The Florida Bar Ethics Department was not, in the court's opinion, determinative. Id.
at 324. Although the Bar staff opinion correctly concluded that the law firm's continued
representation of the client would be unethical under these circumstances, this did not change
the fact that the firm, not the client, created the ethical dilemma. Id. Regarding issuance of
informal advisory opinions, see FloridaBar Proceduresfor Ruling on Questions of Ethics, 70
FLA. B. J. 684, 864-85 (Sept. 1996).
148. 711 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). See also supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
149. Franklin,711 So. 2d at 47-48 (emphasis omitted).
150. Id. at48.
151. Id. at49.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 49-50.
154. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
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1.5(d),155 the court concluded that, under the facts of this case, "[i]n the
absence of a legal determination by the court that the fee contract is illegal,
prohibited or excessive, under a periodic fee agreement for services already
performed the lawyer is entitled to a money judgment for the amount of fees
due under the contract. ' 56
Despite what appeared to be a favorable construction of law, the firm
ended up with a disappointing result. Although it might have prevailed in an
action at law seeking a money judgment, the firm was seeking to recover on
a charging lien theory. A basic tenant of Florida law is that a charging lien
can attach only to funds or property recovered in the case at issue. 57 In this
case, there had been no such recovery
to which a lien could attach and, thus,
15
the court reversed the judgment. 8
Application of the ethics rules prohibiting clearly excessive fees was a
central issue in another charging lien case. In Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin &
McLeod v. State,1 59 lawyers who represented the state in litigation against
tobacco companies attempted to enforce their claimed charging lien. 6° - The
state moved to quash the lien under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
under other grounds. The trial court ultimately quashed the lien, but on
grounds neither pleaded nor argued by the parties. 61 Relying on the
155. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-1.5, "ENFORCEABILITY OF FEE CONTRACTS,"
provides:

(d) Enforceability of Fee Contracts. Contracts or agreements for attorney's
fees between attorney and client will ordinarily be enforceable according to
the terms of such contracts or agreements, unless found to be illegal, obtained
through advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, prohibited by this rule, or clearly excessive as
defined by this rule.
RPC 4-1.5(d).

In prefacing its reference to RPC 4-1.5(d), the court cited Chandris, supra
notes 67 and 81, for the proposition that "fee contracts that do not comply with the
lawyer disciplinary rules are subject to being held void as against public policy."
Franklin,711 So. 2d at 51 n.8. The court noted that there was "no evidence that the

present agreement was obtained through noncomplying advertising or solicitation."
Id. at 51.

156. Id. at 52 (citing Lugassy v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 636 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.
1994); Pierce v. Issac, 184 So. 509 (Fla. 1938); Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Law
Offices of Frank H. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
157. See, e.g., Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, P.A., 517
So. 2d 88, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
158. Franklin,711 So. 2d at 52.
159. 711 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

160. Id. at 1247.
161. Id. at 1249.

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:161

rationale of Chandris,162 the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the
amount of fee claimed by the law
firms was violative of the RPC 4-1.5 as
1 63
unreasonable and unconscionable.
The law firms appealed the order, asserting that the court raised the
issue of unconscionability of the claimed fee sua sponte without proper
notice, and that the firms had no opportunity to present evidence or argument
relating to this issue. Holding that the trial court's action denied the law
firms due process, the appellate
court reversed the order and remanded the
64
case for further proceedings.'
As seen above, the majority of attorney's lien cases reported in 1998
dealt with charging liens. Florida law recognizes a second type of common
66
law attorney's lien, called a "retaining lien. 165 Rathbu v. Policastro
67
involved an interesting application of the retaining lien doctrine.
Despite
a lawyer's assertion of a retaining lien, the trial court ordered the lawyer to
disclose during her testimony all statements made to others by her. 68 In
addressing the matter on appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted
that, as it stated in a prior decision, "the value of a retaining lien rests
entirely upon the attorney's right to retain possession until the bill is paid"
and that, consequently, "courts may not impair that lien by compelling
disclosure of the paper or items" upon which the attorney asserts the lien. 6 9Although the court had not ordered the lawyer to reveal her file or any items
in it, the appellate court reasoned that the order compelling testimonial
disclosure of the statements in question could result in disclosure of work
product information and thus could "improperly impinge upon [the lawyer]'s
retaining lien, just as forced disclosure of71her file's contents could do."'10
Accordingly, the court quashed the order.'
Florida courts addressed a final aspect of the lawyer-client relationship
in cases where that relationship was broken down as a result of the lawyer's
162. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
163. Kerrigan, 711 So. 2d at 1249 (citing RPC 4-1.5(a)). See supra note 154 and
accompanying text.
164. Kerrigan,711 So. 2d at 1249.
165. A retaining lien is a possessory lien, asserted as security for payment of accrued
but unpaid fees or costs, that a lawyer has on papers, funds, and other property of his or her
client that comes into the lawyer's possession in the course of the lawyer's professional
employment. See, e.g, Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1986); Wintter v.
Fabber, 618 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Dowda & Fields, P.A. v. Cobb, 452
So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
166. 703 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
167. Id. at 537.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Rathburn, 703 So. 2d at 537.
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alleged legal malpractice. 172 Although the preamble to the FloridaRules of
ProfessionalConduct states that the violation of a rule "should not give rise
to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached," 173 there are instances in which the rules are relevant to
issues of alleged malpractice. 174 Rule 4-1.8(h), for example, sets parameters
within which lawyers who wish to limit their liability to clients for legal
malpractice must operate. 175 176
In FloridaBar v. Jordan, a lawyer had represented a client in a civil
action that the trial court ultimately dismissed. 7 7 The lawyer did not notify
the client of the dismissal. When the client became aware of the dismissal
and confronted the lawyer, the lawyer offered to pay the client for her
damages by entering into a contract with her. The lawyer, however, "never
advised [the client] that she should seek independent representation in
connection with a claim for professional malpractice."17 8 The Supreme
Court of Florida concluded that this conduct violated RPC 4-1.8(h) and, for
179
this and other violations, suspended the lawyer from practice for one year.
Another case, Kozich v. Shahady,rS° discussed the lawyer-client
relationship in the context of a legal malpractice action. 18 1 A law firm
represented a client in a civil matter. Four days before the jury rendered its
verdict, the client assigned his right to the jury award to his brother.
Unhappy with the amount of the verdict, the client sued the law firm for
malpractice. In its defense, the firm argued that the client was not the real
party in interest because of the assignment that he executed in favor of his
172. See infra notes 173, 177.
173. RPC preamble.

174. Id.
175. Rathburn, 703 So. 2d at 537. Subdivision (h) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF
INTEREST; PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(h) Limiting Liability for Malpractice. A lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement. A lawyer shall not settle a claim for
such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate
in connection therewith.
RPC 4-1.8(h).
176. 705 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1998).
177. Id. at 1389.
178. Id. at 1390.
179. Id.
180. 702 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
181. Id. at 1289.
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brother in the underlying suit. 8 2 If this argument was valid, the firm would
Florida
have been insulated from malpractice liability in the case because
183
law does not recognize assignments of legal malpractice claims.
Reversing the summary judgment that the trial court had granted in
favor of the firm, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the client
had assigned only his right to "the jury award," not his entire interest in the
case.1 84 This limited assignment did not constitute an assignment of his
subsequent claim against the firm for malpractice.1 85 "[T]he effect of
assigning only his right to any future award was to retain in [the client] the
ability to control the conduct of the trial, to accept or reject any settlement
offers, and to maintain the attorney-client relationship, with any
corresponding obligations."'' 86 The bar against assigning malpractice claims
arises from the highly personal and confidential nature of the lawyer-client
of the question presented, had not been
188
relationship,187 and, for purposes
S
affected by the limited assignment.
Turner v. Anderson189 was an unusual case indicating that clients cannot
evade responsibility for their actions by asserting that they took those actions
at the direction of their lawyers.19° The client had committed perjury,
allegedly on the advice of the law firm that represented him and his
employer in a securities arbitration matter. The matter resulted in an award
against the client and, in a lesser amount, against the employer.' 9' The client
sued the law firm for malpractice and for breach of its fiduciary duty. He
claimed that the firm breached its duty to him by advising him to testify
untruthfully, and that he followed this advice to his detriment. The firm
defended by arguing that the doctrine of in pari delicto'92 barred the claim
and that the client's claims were an impermissible collateral attack on the
trial court granted summary judgment for the firm on both
award. 1The
93
grounds.

182. Id. at 1290.
183. See, e.g., Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 459 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984).
184. Kozich, 702 So. 2d at 1290.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Washington, 459 So. 2d at 1149.
188. Kozich, 702 So. 2d at 1291.
189. 704 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
190. Id. at 749.

191. Id.
192. In pari delicto has been defined as "[in] equal fault; equally culpable or criminal;
in a case of equal fault or guilt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (6th ed. 1991).
193. Turner, 704 So. 2d at 749.
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Reversing without much discussion on the collateral attack ground, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal spent the bulk of its opinion explaining why
it affirmed the lower court on the in paridelicto ground.194 The court began
by noting that the "question of whether a client who does an illegal act on
advice of counsel can sue counsel for damages resulting therefrom" was a
matter of first impression in Florida.' 95 After reviewing authorities from
other jurisdictions, the court ultimately concluded that, under the facts in the
case before it, the client's misconduct precluded him from recovering
damages 196for the perjury that he allegedly committed on the advice of
counsel.

m11.

THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COURT AND
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

One of the most important, yet difficult, relationships that lawyers have
is with the courts, of which they are officers, and with the judicial system.
Cases in 1998 addressed various aspects of this relationship: 1) the
propriety of a lawyer's dual role as advocate and witness in the same matter;
2) the lawyer's obligation of candor toward a tribunal;' 97 3) the lawyer's
withdrawal from a matter in litigation;' 98 4) a lawyer's disqualification from
a litigated matter;' 99 and 5) the appropriateness of a lawyer's trial conduct
particularly in the context of real or perceived professionalism obligations.ia
In the course of representing a client a lawyer can act in many roles,
and this often does not implicate professional responsibility issues. One area
in which the FloridaRules of Professional Conduct specifically addresses
the multiplicity of roles is in the context of a lawyer who wishes to act as
both an advocate and a witness on behalf of a client.2" Rule 4-3.7 ordinarily
20 2
precludes the same lawyer from acting in both of these roles at trial.

194. Id. at 750.

195. Id.
196. Id. at 752.
197. See Conquest v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly D928 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. Apr. 6, 1998).
198. See Garcia v. Manning, 717 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
199. See Billings, Cunningham, Morgan & Boatwright, P.A. v. Isom, 701 So. 2d 1271
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
200. See LM. Lumber, Inc. v. M.L. Builders, Inc., 706 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).
201. See H.B.A. Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997).
202. RPC 4-3.7, "LAWYER AS WITNESS," provides:
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In Conquest v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 20 3 the Second District Court
of Appeal expressed its concern about a lawyer being both an advocate and a
witness. 2 04 The court noted that "neither Conquest nor her attorney" had
testified regarding the willingness of the client, Conquest, to accept an offer
below policy limits 0 5 In a footnote, the court acknowledged that it was
"puzzled by the fact that Conquest's trial counsel became a significant
witness in the trial." 2 1 This, stated the court, appeared to be a "clear
violation" of rule 4-3.7.2.7
The purpose of rule 4-3.7 was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Scott v. State.20 8 In appealing from the denial of postconviction
relief, a lawyer's former client argued that the trial court had erred by
allowing an assistant state attorney to serve as both prosecutor and as a
witness at the postconviction relief hearing. The lawyer in question
represented the state in that matter, in which his former client called him as a
witness to testify regarding alleged Brady20 9 violations by the state in the
original trial. In his appeal from the postconviction proceeding, the former
client claimed that the prosecutor's dual role violated ethical and
constitutional considerations. Rejecting this argument, the supreme court
provided some helpful clarification regarding the scope and purpose of rule
4-3.7:

(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is
no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to
the testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as
advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be
called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9
[concerning conflicts of interest].
RPC 4-3.7.
203. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D928 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1998).
204. Id. at D930.
205. Id. at D929.
206. Id. at D930 n.3.
207. Id.
208. 717 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1998).
209. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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[A] purpose of the rule is to prevent the evils that arise when a

lawyer dons the hats of both an advocate and witness for his or her
own client. Such a dual role can prejudice the opposing side or
create a conflict of interest. These concerns are not implicated in
the present case where the state attorney was called as a witness for
the other side on a Brady
210 claim in a post conviction evidentiary
hearing before a judge.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the scope of RPC 4-3.7
21 when a personal representative of an estate sought
in Larkin v. Pirthauer,
certiorari review of an order disqualifying her lawyer.212 The lawyer in
question apparently had been involved in the preparation and execution of
the testator's will. The personal representative for the testator's estate
engaged that lawyer to represent her. It became clear that the lawyer would
be a witness in a will contest in which testamentary capacity and undue
influence were issues. The Fourth District Court of Appeal denied certiorari,
but in doing so limited the scope of the disqualification order.213 The court
stated, "[a]lthough the order of disqualification does not so provide, we
interpret it to disqualify counsel only from the litigation,
,,214 and not from other
matters pertaining to the administration of the estate.
The court's view of
the proper scope of a disqualification order founded on RPC 4-3.7 is
consistent with the language of the rule and with the result reached in a
recent First District Court of Appeal case which disqualified a lawyer from
trial representation but not from pretrial or posttrial representation in the
case.
When acting as an advocate, one of the most important obligations that
a lawyer has is that of candor to the tribunal. 216 Two 1998 cases specifically
addressed this obligation as it applied to prosecuting attorneys. Garcia v.
217
218
Manning
was held
an appeal
a civil
proceeding.
appellate court
that arising
the trialfrom
judge
had contempt
improperly
applied the The
law

210. Scott, 717 So. 2d at 908.
211. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
212. Id. at 182.
213. Id. at 183.
214. Id.
215. Fleitman v. McPherson, 691 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See
Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, ProfessionalResponsibility: 1997 Survey of
FloridaLaw, 22 NoVA L. REv. 215, 249 (1997), for a discussion of Fleitman v. McPherson.
216. See, e.g., RPC 4-3.3, "CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL."
217. 717 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
218. Id. at 59.
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regarding the contemnor's ability to pay.219 Additionally, however, in a
lengthy footnote, the court criticized the prosecutor's conduct in encouraging
the judge to incarcerate the unrepresented contemnor, despite his apparent
Court of Appeal's
inability to pay. 2 .° .Agreeing
. ... with the Fourth District
.221
opinion in DilalloBy and Through Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc., the court
noted that RPC 4-1.1222 and 4-3.3(3)223 "imply a duty to know and disclose to
the court adverse legal authority" and that it "construe[d] these rules to also
require an attorney to provide full information to the trial court such that the
court has all necessary information to determine the issue presented to it."2 24
This obligation, the court stated, is particularly important when the
6
opposing party is unrepresented . 22
The second case, State v. James,2 6 did not consider silence in the face
of an obligation to speak, but, rather, affirmative misrepresentations by the
prosecutor.227 The prosecutor had represented to the court that the state
228
When
would call a certain witness, but rested without calling her.
questioned about this after the defense moved for a mistrial, the prosecutor
stated that he knew when the case began that he would not be calling the
witness. 22 9 The Third District Court of Appeal court "heartily endorse[d]"
the trial court's expression of "utmost concern" regarding the prosecutor's
"lack of candor and professionalism"f in misleading the court regarding his
intentions concerning the witness. 230
Issues relating to a lawyer's withdrawal from a litigated matter were
discussed in several 1997 and 1998 cases. Billings, Cunningham, Morgan &
219. Id.
220. Id. at 60 n.4. The court closed its note by stating that further conduct of the same
type would "require a referral to The Florida Bar for disciplinary action." Id.
221. 687 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See Chinaris & Tarbert, supra
note 177, at 242-43 for a discussion of DilalloBy and Through Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc..
"A lawyer shall provide
222. RPC 4-1.1, "COMPETENCE," provides that:
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." RPC 4-1.1.
223. Subdivision (a)(3) of RPC 4-3.3, "CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL,"
provides that:
"A lawyer shall not knowingly... fail to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel[.]"
RPC 4-3.3(a)(3).
224. Garcia,707 So. 2d at 60 n.4 (citing RPC 4-1.1, 3.3(3)).
225. Id.
226. 710 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
227. Id. at 181.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 182 n.4.
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Boatwrixht, P.A. v. Isom23 1 turned on the trial court's application of RPC 41.16(c), z32 which recognizes the long standing rule that a judge has the
inherent authority to determine whether a law firm will be permitted to
withdraw from litigation, regardless of the existence of ethical elements that
would militate in favor of withdrawal.233 In Isom, a law firm settled a case
for its personal injury client, who signed a release. 4 The client later moved
to set aside the settlement due to allegedly incorrect advice from the firm's
associate regarding the effect of the release. Concluding that there was a
conflict between its interests and those of the client, the firm moved to
withdraw.23 After "analyz[ing] the complex factors in this case," the Fifth
District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court did not depart from
essential requirements of law by denying the firm's motion to withdraw. 3 6
Referencing RPC 4-1.16(c), the court viewed this as a situation in which the
trial court had the authority to order continued representation "even when
potential ethical conflicts are presented. 2 37
An interesting contention regarding a perceived duty to withdraw
appeared in Remeta v. State.23 Capital Collateral Regional Counsel
("CCRC") moved to withdraw as counsel for a death row inmate. The trial
court denied the motion, and CCRC appealed. 239 CCRC alleged that a
conflict existed as a result of statements and questions from members of an
oversight committee, the Commission on the Administration of Justice, in
capital cases regarding the handling of related litigation involving the
client. In affirming the order, the supreme court agreed with the trial judge
that "if the facts as set forth by CCRC constitute conflict, the entire legal
system would collapse because there is not a public defender who does not

231. 701 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
232. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING
REPRESENTATION," provides that: "When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation." RPC
4-1.16(c).
233. Isom, 701 So. 2d at 1272.
234. Id.
235. Id. In moving to withdraw, the firm stated that it had been advised by The Florida
Bar that its withdrawal was mandatory pursuant to RPC 4-1.16(a). Presumably the firm sought
an informal advisory opinion from the Bar ethics staff. Id.
236. Id.
237. Isom, 701 So. 2d at 1272 (citing RPC 4-1.16(c)).
238. 707 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1998).
239. Id. at719.
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have the same asserted 'conflict.' 24° Every government official must account
to some governing body as to how it allocates it[s] [sic] resources." 24'
Public defenders see certain recurring issues relating to withdrawal.
One of these issues is the ethically and procedurally proper method of
handling the situation that arises when a criminal defense client wishes to
move to withdraw his or her guilty plea on the basis that counsel advised
improperly or negligently concerning the plea. In two Florida cases, Karg v.
State2 2 and Holifield v. State,243 the First District Court of Appeal reaffirmed
that in this situation counsel is faced with a conflict of interest that requires
the appointment of conflict free counsel for the purpose of representation on
the motion to withdraw the plea.244 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
discussed this procedure, and the rationale supporting it, more fully in
Roberts v. State.
Another recurring withdrawal issue for public defenders relates to the
likelihood that one of their former clients will testify against a current client.
Costa v. State246 arose from a trial court's denial of an assistant public
defender's motion to withdraw. 247 The motion certified the existence of an
irreconcilable conflict between the lawyer's current client and a former
client based on confidential communications with the former client
concerning issues relevant to the present case. 24s In quashing the order and
remanding with directions to grant the motion, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal cited authority, including Guzman v. State,249 holding that a public
defender2 50should be permitted to withdraw upon certifying the existence of a
conflict.
Similarly, the denial of an assistant public defender's motion to
withdraw was reversed in Cankur v. State.25 The public defender's former
client was identified as a prosecution witness. 252 When the public defender
moved to withdraw, the state attempted to eliminate the problem by offering
240. Id.
241. Id. at719-20.
242. 706 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
243. 717 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
244. Id.; Karg, 706 So. 2d at 125.
245. 670 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see Chandris, 668 So. 2d
180, 253-54 (Fla. 1995) and supra note 55 and accompanying text.
246. 712 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
247. Id. at 456.

248. Id.
249.
1982).
250.
1994)).
251.
252.

644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994). See also Babb v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 859 (Fla.
Costa, 712 So. 2d at 456 (citing Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla.
706 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 944.
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to refrain from calling the witness.25 3 The court then denied the motion. 25 4
255
256
Citing Guzman2ss as well as other cases,
the appellate court reversed,
stating that "under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required
to grant the motion to withdraw without reweighing the facts considered
' 25 7 by
a conflict exists.
that
and certifying
the public defender in determining
58
•
259
• • •
In a concurring opinion, Crowe v. State criticized Guzman.
Judge
Dauksch argued that trial judges should have discretion to analyze the nature
of the conflict and the surrounding
• 260circumstances in ruling on motions to
withdraw filed by public defenders.
In contrast to cases involving a lawyer's attempted voluntary
withdrawal from a litigated matter, a number of cases deal with the
involuntary removal of a lawyer or law firm from litigation. These cases
include conflicts involving a lawyer's current clients,26l a lawyer's former
clients, 262 imputed disqualification resulting from the movement of
nonlawyer employees between law firms, 632 4and the involvement of lawyers
with former employees of opposing parties. 6
A basic principle of conflicts law is that, in the same litigated matter
one lawyer or law firm may not represent both a plaintiff and a defendant.261
253. Id.
254. Id.

255. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
256. Cankur,706 So. 2d at 945 (citing Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995); Crowe v. State, 701 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997)). See also infra
note 151.
257. Cankur,706 So. 2d at 944-45.
258. 701 So. 2d 431, 431-32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Dauksch, J., specially
concurring).
259. Id. at 432.

260. Id. at 431-32.
261. Cardasis v. HP America, Inc., 710 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Henry v. Entertainment Design, Inc., 711 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
262. J.M. Lumber, Inc. v. M.L. Builders, Inc., 706 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Rodell v. Narson, 706 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); King v. Byrd, 23 Fla.
L. Weekly Dl 173 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1998), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g,
716 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
263. City of Apopka v. All Comers, Inc., 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lackow v.
Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
264. Carnival Corp. v. Romero, 710 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); H.B.A.
Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997); Rentclub, Inc. v.
Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
265. RPC 4-1.7 cmt. (discussing prohibition representing opposing parties in
litigation).
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In Cardasisv. HP America, Inc.,266 the Third District Court of Appeal ruled
that "the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law" by
denying the defendants' motion to disqualify the plaintiff's lawyers from
also representing one of the defendants in the pending case below. 267 The

matter was remanded with directions to grant the motion and to disqualify
the lawyers in question from representing any party in the case.268
An unusual conflicting scenario was present in Henry v. Entertainment
Design, Inc.a69 A law firm opposed an individual who was represented on
unrelated matters by another office of that law firm. This conflict became
known to the client after rendition of an unfavorable jury verdict in a case
where the firm opposed him. 27 Upon discovery of the conflict, the client
sought relief from the verdict. Clearly this situation presented a conflict of
interest; the trial court faced the question of how to deal with the conflict
problem at the juncture at which it arose in the case.271 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of requested relief, holding
that the 27
client
was unable to demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of the
2
conflict.

J.M. Lumber, Inc. v. M.L. Builders, Inc.273 is a disqualification case
based on conflicts involving a lawyer's former clients. 274 The decision in
this case focused on the pro er application of RPC 4-1.9, 275 governing
conflicts with former clients.
The plaintiffs lawyer, in post judgment
execution proceedings, formerly represented one of the defendants in various
matters. Defendants moved to disqualify the lawyer. At the evidentiary
hearing on the motion, the trial court found that plaintiffs counsel had not
breached his duty of lawyer-client confidentiality and that the matter in
question was not related to any knowledge gained in representing his former
client. 277

The court nevertheless

concluded

that an appearance

of

impropriety existed and disqualified the lawyer, "finding simply that it was
too close
in time to the prior representation which had ceased three years
' 278
earlier.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

710 So. 2d 146 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 146.
Id.
711 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 181.
706 So. 2d 84 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 84-85.
See RPC 4-1.9 supra note 23.
J.M. Lumber, 706 So. 2d at 85.
Id.
Id.
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the order of
disqualification. 279 Referencing RPC 4-1.9, the court stated that the trial
court's order departed from the essential requirements of law because it did
not make a specific finding that the matters involved in the lawyer's
representation of the plaintiff were substantially related to the matters
covered by his previous representation of the defendant.2 0 The court thus
recognized that RPC 4-1.9 contains two independent and distinct tests that
must be examined in a former client conflict situation: 1) whether the
former and current matters are substantially related; and 2) whether,
regardless of any relationship between the matters, there are issues of client

confidentiality present.28
Another case in which RPC 4-1.9 was central did not concern
disqualification, but the propriety of awarding attorney's fees under section
57.105 of the Florida Statutes.282 In Rodell v. Narson,2s3 a party hired a
lawyer who had previously been consulted by another party about certain
property that was the subject of litigation. 4 During the earlier consultation,
confidential information regarding the property was disclosed to the lawyer.
Subsequently, the party who originally consulted the lawyer moved to

disqualify the lawyer based on an alleged violation of RPC 4-1.9.

On

appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that the motion to disqualify

279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id. (citing RPC 4-1.9).
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1997). Section 57.105 of the FloridaStatutes provides:
(1) The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the
prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party's
attorney in any civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete
absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or
defense of the losing party; provided, however, that the losing party's
attorney is not personally responsible if he or she has acted in good faith,
based on the representations of his or her client. If the court finds that there
was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by
the defense, the court shall also award prejudgment interest.
(2) If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney's fees to a party
when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court
may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party when that party
prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the
contract. This act shall take effect October 1, 1988, and shall apply to
contracts entered into on said date or thereafter.
FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1997).
283. 706 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
284. Id. at 393.
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was a "meritorious claim" that was not subject to Florida Statutes section
57.105 award of fees.285
As noted above, the protection of client confidentiality is one of the key
elements of RPC 4-1.9. However, this protection is not absolute. The rule
provides that a lawyer who now opposes a former client may not use
confidential information to the disadvantage of the former client "except as
rule 4-1.6 would permit with
,,286 respect to a client or when the information has
become generally known.
Although some lawyers equate "generally
known" information with information that is a matter of public record, the
district court in King v. Byrd287 made clear that these two terms are not
synonymous for purposes of conflict of interest analysis. 28 A lawyer
defended a doctor in a medical malpractice action.2 89 One of the plaintiff's
expert witnesses was a doctor whom the lawyer had represented in an
administrative grievance proceeding filed by a patient.
The lawyer
attempted to attack the expert with, inter alia, the existence of this grievance
proceeding. On appeal, the court ruled that it was error to allow this crossexamination. 20 Replying to the lawyer's contention that this proceeding was
a matter of public record and therefore "generally known" under RPC 4-1.9,
the court commented, "[w]e are not prepared to state that all information
contained in any public document is 'generally known' within the meaning
of the rule. 291 Although not expressly stated in the opinion, the court
implicitly recognized that the real question when analyzing a "generally
known" question is not whether the information is a matter of public record,
but whether, but for the lawyer's prior representation of the client, the
292
lawyer would know of the existence and location of that information.
In Carnival Corp. v. Romero, 3 two expert witnesses for the plaintiff
were former employees of the defendant cruise line.294 The defendant
moved to disqualify the experts on the ground that they had information
protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges. Additionally,
285. Id.
286. RPC 4-1.9(b) (emphasis supplied). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
287. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1173 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1998), withdrawn and
supersededon reh'g, 716 So. 2d 831 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
288. Id. atDl175.
289. Id. atD1174.
290. Id. atDl175.
291. Id.
292. See King, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at Dl175. Interestingly, the defendant's lawyer
complained that plaintiff's counsel had unfairly questioned his ethics. Id. at Dl174. The
court, however, expressed "substantial concerns as to the ethics of defense counsel's attacks
on his former client." Id. at D1 175.
293. 710 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
294. Id. at 691.
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the defense moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the basis of allegedly
improper contact with the defendant corporation's former employees and
because of an alleged appearance of impropriety. The trial court denied the
motions, and the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court did
not depart from the essential requirements of law in denying the motions. 5
Regarding potential disqualification of the plaintiff's counsel, the
appellate court cited the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in H.B.A.
Management,Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz2 96 holding that RPC 4-4.2297 did not
prohibit a lawyer from ex parte contacts with former employees of a
represented corporation. 298 Although in making such contacts a lawyer is not
ethically permitted to inquire into matters subject to attorney-client privilege,
the defendant had not shown that its former employees, the experts, had

access to any protected communications. 299
Moreover, the defendant cruise line did not succeed in demonstrating
that the law firm had engaged in the appearance of impropriety. 300 The
defendant relied on Rentclub, Inc. v. TransamericaRental Finance Corp.,3 °'

in which a law firm was disqualified from representing its client in litigation
after the firm hired a former high ranking officer of its represented corporate

295. Id. at 695.

296. 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997). The Carnivalcourt noted that H.B.A. Management
relied on Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee Opinion 88-14, (1989) which concluded
that it was not unethical for a lawyer to contact former employees of a represented
organization, provided the lawyer did not inquire into privileged matters. Carnival,710 So.
2d at 692-93 (citing H.B.A. Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla.
1997)).
297. Schwartz, 693 So. 2d at 546. See RPC 4-4.2, "COMMUNICATION WITH
PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL," which provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior
consent, communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements
of any statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an
adverse party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted to
that required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the
adverse party's attorney.
RPC 4-4.2.
298. Carnival,710 So. 2d at 693; see Lackow v. Walter, 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
299. Carnival,710 So. 2d at 693.
300. Id. at 692-93.
301. 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
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opponent as a "trial consultant." 302 In rejecting this argument, the court
distinguished Rentclub in several ways: 1) the Supreme Court of Florida
decided H.B.A. Management after the federal court's decision in Rentclub;
2) the experts in the instant case had not been high-level, managerial
employees; and 3) importantly, there was no showing that either had access
to any confidential or privileged information. 30 3 Thus, the court stated,
"[w]e do not think this case is one which requires disqualification based on
the attorney having gained access to an adversary party's privileged
communications or documents, thereby gaining an informational
advantage. ' 3 °"
Disqualification of the experts was not required because it was not
established that either expert had access to privileged information or
materials protected by the work product doctrine. 305
The court
acknowledged that the "prospect of paying [one of the experts] for this fact
testimony [relating to information gathered during employment regarding
other, unrelated incidents] could pose a possible violation under [RPC] 43.4," but stated that "anyopayments made in this case are also intertwined
with his expert opinion.
30
City ofApopka v. All Comers, Inc. addressed the question of imputed
disqualification when nonlawyer employees of law firms move from one
employing firm to another.
Rule 4-1.10(a) provides that most conflict
problems of one lawyer in a law firm are imputed to the other lawyers in that
firm, but is silent with respect to how these
30 9rules apply to nonlawyer firm
employees such as secretaries or paralegals.
302. Carnival,710 So. 2d at 693 (citing Rentclub, 43 F.3d at 1439-40).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 695. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-3.4, "FAIRNESS OF OPPOSING
PARTY AND COUNSEL," provides that:
A lawyer shall not:
fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness, except a lawyer may pay a witness reasonable
expenses incurred by the witness in attending or testifying at proceedings; a
reasonable, noncontingent fee for the professional services of an expert
witness; and reasonable compensation to reimburse a witness for the loss of
compensation incurred by reason of preparing for, attending, or testifying at
proceedings.
RPC 4-3.4(b).
307. 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
308. Id. at 642.
309. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.10, "IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION;
GENERAL RULE," provides that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
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Two earlier Florida cases, as well as an opinion of the Florida Bar
310
Professional Ethics Committee, addressed the nonlawyer issue. In Lackow
v. Walter E. Heller & Co.,311 the Third District Court of Appeal disqualified
a law firm that hired a secretary from another law firm that opposed the
hiring firm in a litigated matter. 312 While with her former employer, the
secretary clearly had access to confidential information and trial preparation
materials. In fact, she had worked on the case in question. No showing that
a breach of confidentiality had occurred was required.313 However, a
different approach was taken by the Second District Court of Appeal in
Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire.
There the court declined to adopt a
presumption that confidentiality was breached. 5 Rather, the court required
a hearing to determine "not just whether a potential ethical violation has
occurred, but whether as a result one party has obtained an unfair advantage
' 31 6
over the other which can only be alleviated by removal of the attorney."
The Professional Ethics Committee's Opinion 86-5 expressed the view
that the rules governing the movement of lawyers between opposing law
firms did not apply to nonlawyers.3 7 The opinion focused instead on the
ethical obligations of the law firms to advise the moving nonlawyer not to
breach confidentiality and to refrain from seeking any confidential
information from the moving nonlawyer 3 18 After discussing the varied
approaches in Florida case law, the All Corners court stated, "we align
ourselves with the Second District and hold that disqualification is required
only when there is evidence that the law firm obtained confidential
information, thereby gaining an unfair advantage, from its new personnel. 3 19
Attorneys are often most visible to the public in their role as advocates
at trial. An attorney's behavior at trial is subject to the Rules of Professional
Conduct, rules of court, and case law. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
conduct of attorneys during trial is subject to close scrutiny and criticism.

shall knowingly represent a client when any 1 of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by rule 4-1.7,4-1.8(c), 4-1.9, or 4-2.2." RPC 4-1.10(a).
310. See supra notes 304, 305; Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 86-5
(1986).
311. 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
312. Id. at 1123.
313. Id.
314. 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
315. Id. at742.
316. Id.at741.
317. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 86-5 (1986).
318. Id.at 1119-20.
319. All Comers,701 So. 2d at 644.
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There have been many 1998 cases dealing with improper argument, 320 a
frequent circumstance over the years. 321 Courts most often refer to RPC 43.4(e) 322 when analyzing improper arguments. 323 Although most appeals
based on improper argument do not succeed due to a failure to properly
preserve the objection on the record, the cases do provide examples of what
does and does not constitute impermissible argument. 324 In Airport Rent-aCar v. Lewis,325 the Fourth District Court of Appeal found a counsel's
comments regarding the opposing party's state of mind and reporting the
matter to the IRS to be outside the record, predjudicial, and in violation of
RPC 4-3.4(e). 326 In Cooper v. State,327 the district court found that a
prosecutor's suggestion in closing that "the defendant suborned perjury or
that a defense witness manufactured evidence" was improper since they had

320. See, e.g., Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998); CAC-Ramsay, Inc. v. Mull,
706 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Lewis v. State, 711 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Palazon v. State, 711 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v.
State, 707 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
321. In fact, in two cases published this year, the court commented with frustration on
the large number of improper argument cases. In Murphy v. InternationalRobotics Systems,
Inc., 710 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), Judge Klein stated that "[it seems as
though, in every week in which we sit, we get at least one appeal in which we are asked to
reverse because of improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument of counsel." Id. at 587. In
Palazon v. State, 711 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), a judge wrote a concurrence
"because of my concern with the number of criminal cases we review that involve improper
argument by the State[,]" and suggested distribution of earlier decisions regarding improper
argument on trial benches and counsel tables in every courtroom. Id.
322. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-3.4 provides that:
A lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e).
323. Davis v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 715 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Sawczak v. Goldenberg, 710 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Airport
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Lewis, 701 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hooper v. State,
703 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Goutis v. Express Transp. Inc., 699 So. 2d
757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Murphy v. International Robotics Sys., Inc., 710 So. 2d
587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
324. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 587 (discussing the case law requiring contemporaneous
objection to improper argument).
325. 701 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
326. Id. at 896-97.
327. 712 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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no basis in the facts presented. 32 8 The court gave a scathing criticism of the
prosecutor in this case, stating:
The prosecutor's comments here-impugning the defense
witnesses and the defendant without any record basis--were
improper, unethical and unprofessional; we hereby voice our strong
disapproval of them. The trial judge undoubtedly recognized the
impropriety of the comments because he sustained defense
counsel's objection to them. We urge trial courts to supplement
such rulings, in the future, with an admonishment
to the offending
329
attorney, if not disciplinary sanctions.
Other examples of improper argument by a prosecutor can be found in
Urbin v. State,3°an appeal from a capital case. 33 1 The court found that an
invitation for the jury to disregard the law, criticism of the defendant's
mother for failure to show sympathy for the victim's family, and his "show
no mercy" argument about sentencing were all impermissible. 332 The court
likewise found counsel's statement in closing to the jury to be an improper
"conscience of the community" argument. 333
3 34
In Davis v. South Florida Water Management District,
the appellate
court stated that an attorney improperly "bolstered" credibility and expressed
his own opinion of the evidence when he stated "as a lawyer and an officer
of the court, and an attorney who is proud to represent South Florida Water
Management District and other condemning authorities and private property
owners, I will tell you that $18 million" was overcompensation for a
person's property which was taken in a condemnation action.
On the
other hand, the court in Goutis v. Express Transport,336 found that the mere
use of verbal tics such as "I would propose" or "I submit"
do not amount to a
337
comment by the attorney of his or her own opinion.
Courts are often critical of trial conduct even if they do not find that it
rises to the level of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal rigorously criticized the conduct of two
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 1217.
Id.
714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at411.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 421.
715 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 998.
699 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 763-64 (emphasis omitted).

206

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:161

attorneys throughout the course of a medical malpractice trial in Myron v.
Doctors General Hospital.338 The court, after reversing on other grounds,
stated the following regarding the attorneys' behavior:
[W]e feel compelled to comment on the lawyers' conduct in this
trial. The trial lawyers on this case are all highly professional,
skilled lawyers with excellent reputations. Yet, from reading this
entire transcript, we cannot help but cringe at the exchanges
between them and with the court. The argument, both in front of
the jury and at sidebar, reflected a disrespect of each other and
exasperation with the proceedings. Even the trial court commented
several times that things were getting way out of hand. At one
point, after heated argument, the court said "[y]ou know, the public
is here. There are members of the public here who have not been
with this.... Let's keep it a profession, if we
perhaps associated
339
could please."
34
0
The court then admonished the lawyers to behave themselves in the retrial.

IV. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THIRD PARTIES
In addition to their duties to clients and the court, attorneys also have
duties to opposing parties, attorneys, and other third persons. Among the
most important of these duties is that of honesty. Although an attorney is not
required and sometimes not permitted to reveal information, 341 an attorney
342
may not engage in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended an attorney for ninety
days in a matter in which the attorney stopped payment on a check to a travel
agency.343 The referee found, based on the fact that the attorney immediately
stopped payment on the check, that the attorney intended to deceive the
travel agency, who had already extended the time for payment on a bill of
over $2000 for 120 days. 344 The referee stopped short of finding that the
attorney made misrepresentations to the court by declining to find by the

338. 704 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
339. Id. at 1092-93.
340. Id. at 1093.

341. See RPC 4-1.6. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
342. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-8.4 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not... engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation[.]" RPC 4-8.4(c).
343. Florida Bar v. Schultz, 712 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1998).
344. Id. at 388.
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clear and convincing standard that the check stubs presented 3by
the
45
false.
were
agency
travel
the
to
payment
prove
to
attorney
respondent
Probably the most grievous misrepresentation an attorney can make is
to the court. 346 In addition to dishonesty, misrepresentations to the court
may impact the fair and impartial administration of justice. 347 The Supreme
348
Court of Florida found just such an impact in Florida Bar v. Vining.
Vining represented the wife in a marriage dissolution matter and in her
appeal regarding alimony and attorneys' fees. 349 The appeals court reversed
the trial court's denial of alimony and fees, and a hearing was held on
attorneys' fees.
In the hearing, Vining did not disclose
to the court that he
351
had been paid by the client in the dissolution matter. The court awarded a
fee to be deposited into a supersedeas account which was disbursed in a
check made out to both Vining and his client.351 The client refused to sign
the check over to Vining because she had paid him for his services in the
dissolution. 353 The attorney's motion to disburse the funds on his signature
only, filed without notice to the client, was denied. 354 Vining then filed an
action against the bank to disburse the funds, without informing the
opposing attorney that the client opposed disbursement of the funds to
Vining. 355 The opposing counsel then stipulated to the release of the money
to Vining. 356 The client, on discovery that Vining had obtained the funds,
sued, and recovered for theft.357 Oddly, although the court upheld the
referee's finding that Vining engaged in "dishonest, fraudulent, and deceitful
conduct" before the trial judge, Vining was not found to have violated RPC

345. Id. at 387.
346. RPC 4-3.3.
347. See Schultz, 712 So. 2d at 387. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4 provides that: "A
lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice." RPC 4-8.4(d).
348. 707 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1998).
349. Id. at 671.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Vining, 707 So. 2d at 671.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 672.
357. Id.
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4-3.3(a) concerning candor to the tribunal.358 Vining was suspended for
three years for violations of RPC 4-8.4(c) and (d).359
However
the court did find a violation of RPC 4-3.3 in FloridaBar v.
•
3606..
Hmielewski. Hmielewski represented a client in a Minnesota wrongful
death and medical malpractice matter.361 The client informed Hmielewski
that he had stolen medical records from the facility being sued.362
Hmielewski failed to provide the documents when a discovery request was
made and indicated that all documents in the possession of the client had
already been turned over to the medical facility. 363 He also told the court
that an issue in the case was the failure of the facility to properly maintain
their records, and that the facility had lost the records. 6 Opposing counsel
discovered these misrepresentations during a deposition of Hmielewski's
client.3 65 The court, in sanctioning Hmielewski, found that his "violations
made a mockery of the justice system and flew in the face of [his] ethical
responsibilities as a member of The Florida Bar.' ' 366 The court suspended
Hmielewski for three years, stating that "[i]f it were not for [the absence of
selfish motive], the extremely strong character evidence, and Hmielewski's
relatively unblemished record (one admonishment for minor misconduct in
twenty-one years of practice), this [c]ourt would have no hesitation in
imposing disbarment." 367
In another case involving candor toward the tribunal an attorney was
suspended for ninety days in Florida Bar v. Corbin.36 8 The attorney
358. Vining, 707 So. 2d at 673.
359. Id. at 674. Subdivisions (c) and (d) of RPC 4-8.4 prohibit conduct involving
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, respectively. RPC 48.4(c), (d).
360. 702 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 1997).
361. Id. at 219.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 219-20.
365. Hmielewski, 702 So. 2d at 220.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 221. It is odd that the court found no selfish motive. The referee, as noted
by the court, found that "[t]here was no motive of personal gain behind the respondent's
actions. If anything, the respondent was overzealous in his efforts to promote his client's
interests. The respondent appeared to adopt his client's belief that the Mayo Clinic would
falsify or fabricate medical records regarding his client's father's demise." Id. However, the
case was, in all likelihood, taken on a contingency fee basis. Therefore, the attorney had a
financial interest in the outcome of the case. If the attorney's fee is based on a percentage of
the recovery, the attorney's fee increases proportionately with the size of the award to his
client. If the attorney could establish bad faith on the part of the medical facility, he could
have claimed and received punitive damages.
368. 701 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 1997).
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represented plaintiffs in a civil landlord-tenant dispute. 369 The defendants,
representing themselves, provided the attorney with copies of canceled
checks and told her that some of the rent was paid in cash and some with the
canceled checks. 37 Nevertheless, the attorney filed a motion for summary
judgment, stating that there were no material facts in issue and that the
defendants had paid no rent during the time period covered by the canceled
checks. 37 1 In recommending suspension of Corbin, the referee noted the
larger issue facing the court involving pro se litigants:
The Referee fully appreciates that attorneys and judges have no
responsibility to pro se litigants to assist them in preparing their
case. At the same time, the [c]ourt and the Bar have a
responsibility not to mislead or undermine the efforts of pro se
litigants to represent
themselves. This is a critical issue for the
372
future of our Bar.
Dishonesty can have broad ranging consequences for an attorney. In
Florida Bar v. Ash, 373 an attorney was denied board certification after a
determination that she made false statements on her application for
certification. 374 The attorney, in answering a question of whether a court had
ever questioned her conduct in writing, listed "N/A." The committee on
certification determined that a court had issued a show cause order for
sanctions in an earlier case of the attorney which indicated that she argued
case law which had been quashed.375 Ash cited case law which was in
conflict with case law in that jurisdiction, and failed to disclose a Supreme
Court of Florida case which was in conflict with the case she argued.376 The
supreme court, in upholding the denial of the certification, indicated that "it
is difficult to conceive of a clearer violation of the oath of truthfulness at the
conclusion of the application" in referring the matter to The Florida Bar for
investigation.377
An attorney also owes duties to other lawyers in some circumstances.
Often, questions of a lawyer's relationship to another lawyer revolve around
the division of attorney fees. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, in Miller v.
369. Id. at 334.

370. Id. at 335.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id.

Id.
701 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 553-54.

375. Id.
376. Id. at 554.
377. Id.
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Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., found that an employment contract requiring
departing lawyers to pay the attorneys' prior firm 75% of fees earned from
clients taken when they left the firm is valid and enforceable. 378 The case
involved enforcement of an employment contract signed by associates of the
firm. The contract called for the payment of 75% of the fees earned by the
associates in their own private practice after they left the firm for clients who
were initially clients of the law firm. All of the clients involved had
personal injury cases with the firm prior to departing and accepting
representation by the former associates of the firm. The former associates
argued that the employment contract was void against public policy since it
infringed on the client's right to choose her own attorney by placing an
economic disincentive on the attorney. Ordinarily, the former firm would be
entitled to some fee for the value of services performed by the firm prior to
the client's departure. 379 The court declined to find the contract void as to
public policy but overturned the case on other grounds. 380 In doing so, the
court cited two Florida ethics opinions which discuss division of fees
between a departing lawyer and the law firm.381 The court failed to even
mention Florida Ethics Opinion 93-4,382 in which the Florida Bar
Professional Ethics Committee opined that an employment contract which
required payment of 50% of fees generated by a former client of the law firm
violated RPC 4-5.6, 383 regulating restrictions on the right to practice.
Ironically, shortly before the Miller case was decided, the Supreme Court of
Florida clarified the rule against restrictions against the right to practice by
adding language to the comment discussing law firm employment
.384

378. 699 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
379. An attorney in a contingent fee case who is discharged by the client without cause
prior to a recovery is usually entitled to quantum meruit for the value of services provided
prior to discharge. Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
380. Miller, 699 So. 2d at 732.
381. Id. (citing Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 94-1 (1994) and Fla. Bar
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 84-1 (1984, rev. 1993) (concluding that such a division of
fees is a matter of contract, not ethics)).
382. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 93-4 (1995).
383. Miller, 699 So. 2d at 732. RPC 4-5.6 provides:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement
concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice
is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.
RPC 4-5.6.
384. Miller, 699 So. 2d at 732.
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385
contracts.
RPC 4-5.6: The court added the following discussion to comment to the

This rule is not a per se prohibition against severance agreements
between lawyers and law firms. Severance agreements containing
reasonable and fair compensation provisions designed to avoid
disputes requiring time-consuming quantum meruit analysis are not
prohibited by this rule. Severance agreements, on the other hand,
that contain punitive clauses, the effect of which are to restrict
competition or encroach upon a client's inherent right to select
counsel, are prohibited.386
Following the decision in the Miller case, the Professional Ethics
Committee was asked to review enforcement of a contract, found to be
*388
unethical in an earlier ethics opinion, 387 in
light of the court decision.
The
committee declined to answer the question because it involved past conduct
of the attorney. 389 The inquirer appealed the Professional Ethics Committee
decision to the Florida Bar Board of Governors. The committee declined to
issue an advisory opinion in response to an inquiry regarding
enforcement
of
,
390
a contract involving restrictions on an attorney's right to practice.
At its
meeting on April 3, 1998, the Florida Bar Board of Governors reviewed the
decision and voted to overturn the decision of the committee, but declined to
recede from Florida Ethics Opinion 93-4 (approved by the Board of
Governors in February, 1995), notwithstanding39 the
Miller case, as the
1
inquiry related to a contract regarding hourly fees.
385. Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 697 So. 2d
115, 130 (Fla. 1997).
386. Id.

387. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 93-4 (1995).
388. Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee Minutes, January 23, 1998, on file at
The Florida Bar.
389. Id. See also Rule 2(d) of the FloridaBar Proceduresfor Ruling on Questions of

Ethics, which provides:

Ethics counsel shall decline to issue a staff opinion to anyone who either
inquires about another lawyer's conduct or asks a question of law and may
decline to issue a staff opinion when the inquiry raises a question for which
there is no previous precedent or underlying bar policy upon which to base an

opinion. When ethics counsel declines to issue an opinion pursuant to this
rule, ethics counsel shall advise the inquirer of the provisions of rule 3.
Fla. Bar Procedures for Ruling on Questions of Ethics, 2(d)(1998).
390. Minutes of the Florida Bar Board of Governors, (April 3, 1998) (on file at The
Florida Bar).
391. Id.
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The court has continued its efforts in support of the professionalism
movement.3 92 Although declining to find a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, in Florida Bar v. Martocci,393 the Supreme Court394of
Florida chided the attorneys for the "patently unprofessional" conduct.
The attorney directed epithets at another attorney at a deposition and made
other personal remarks about him. The court stated that these actions did not
rise to the level of discipline, but published details of the exchange to point
out the lack of professionalism involved, opining:
As noted in our opening paragraph we find the conduct of the
lawyers involved in the incident giving rise to these proceedings to
be patently unprofessional. We would be naive if we did not
acknowledge that the conduct involved herein occurs far too often.
We should be and are embarrassed and ashamed for all bar
members that such childish and demeaning conduct takes place in
the justice system. It is our hope that by publishing this opinion
and thereby making public the offending and demeaning exchanges
between these particular attorneys, that the entire bar will benefit
and realize an attorney's obligation to adhere to the highest
professional standards of conduct no matter the location or
in which an attorney's services are being
circumstances
395
rendered.
Relationships with the public are often evidenced through the attorney's
conduct at trial. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed that
misbehavior by an attorney in the course of a trial results in sanctions to the
396
The court reversed a dismissal
attorney in the case of Elder v. Norton.
based on misconduct of the attorney during the discovery process, stating
that the client should not suffer for the sins of the attorney, particularly since
there are3 97many sanctions available to the court which directly affect the
attorney.
Supreme Court of Florida Justice Wells criticized the conduct of both
attorneys and judges through both the trial and the appellate process in his
dissent in Valle v. State.3 9 Valle involved an appeal of a capital case in
which the defendant, having been convicted of murder, filed an ineffective
392. See supra n. 60 and accompanying text (discussing the court's activities in the
professionalism movement).
393. 699 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1997).
394. Id. at 1358.
395. Id. at 1360.
396. 711 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
397. Id.
398. 705 So. 2d 1331, 1337 (Fla. 1997) (Wells, J., dissenting).
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assistance of counsel claim. 39 9 The defendant claimed that his counsel
should have filed for recusal of the sentencing judge who allegedly kissed
the victim's wife and conversed with the victim's friends in front of the
jury.40 0 The court found that the allegations were sufficient to warrant an
evidentiary hearing.40 1 However, most interesting was the dissent by Justice
4 2
Wells, which was highly critical of the delay which occurred in the case. 0
Wells stated that "[a]voidance of the delay and the kind of mistake made
here requires only the level of professional competence and attention of
judges and counsel that defendants and the public have a right to expect and
receive in these cases." 40 3 He then pointed out that, although the defendant
40 4
was arrested nearly twenty years before, the case has yet to be resolved.
Wells specifically condemned delay in the capital case, noting that "I do not
believe that a knowing refusal to disclose or failure to have the information
at a hearing are proper tactics. A game of "hide the evidence" has no
appropriate place in these proceedings and should not be tolerated." 40 5
However, advocacy is not the only role that attorneys play in the
courtroom. Attorneys, like all qualified citizens, sometimes play the role of
juror. Attorneys are subject, as are all qualified citizens of the State of
Florida, to a summons for jury service.40 6 Unlike most citizens, however,
attorneys may be excused from408
service by the court. 40 7 The Supreme Court
of Florida, in Hoskins v. State, determined that discretion of the court to
excuse attorneys and others from jury service is not delegable to other court
399. Id. at 1332-33.
400. Id. at 1333.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1336.
403. Valle, 705 So. 2d at 1336 (Wells, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 1337.

405. Id.
406. See generally FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1997).
407. FLA. STAT. § 40.013(5) provides:

A presiding judge may, in his or her discretion, excuse a practicing
attorney, a practicing physician, or a person who is physically infirm from
jury service, except that no person shall be excused from service on a civil
trial jury solely on the basis that the person is deaf or hearing impaired, if that
person wishes to serve, unless the presiding judge makes a finding that
consideration of the evidence to be presented requires auditory discrimination
or that the timely progression of the trial will be considerably affected
thereby. However, nothing in this subsection shall affect a litigant's right to
exercise a peremptory challenge.
FLA. STAT. § 40.013(5) (1997).
408. 702 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1997).
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personnel. 4°9 The case, which involved an appeal from a capital conviction,
addressed an issue regarding the selection of the jury. 41° In that particular
circuit, the chief judge had issued an administrative order which permitted
the clerk to excuse jurors based on the Florida Statutes, including a statute
which gave discretion to the presiding judge to excuse practicing attorneys
from jury service. 41' Although the court denied the appeal for failure to raise
the objection to the jury panel in a timely manner, the court was careful to
note• that
- • the412 procedure permitted by the administrative order was
impermissible.
In so opining, the court stated:
In reaching this decision, however, we emphasize that we are in no
way sanctioning any process whereby a clerk of court is to carry
out statutory mandated judicial responsibilities. We conclude that
trial judges may not delegate their discretionary authority
under
4 13
section 40.013(5) to clerks of court or any other official.
Justice Anstead, in dissent, would have upheld the appeal on the jury
panel issue because the jury panel was not "selected or drawn according to
law. 4 14 Justice Anstead pointed out that the clerk excused classes of people
without having the presiding judge hear their request and rationale for
excusal.41s Justice Anstead also noted his concern that the statute excluded
entire groups of people from service merely because of 416
their profession,
"discarding traditional notions of fairness and public duty."
Attorneys also have a relationship with the State of Florida. An
attorney has responsibilities, not only as a private citizen, but often also in
the course of his or her conduct as an attorney. For example, attorneys are
the subject of legislation specific to their roles as attorneys. 7 The Supreme
Court of Florida found such a statute unconstitutionally vague in State v.
Mark Marks, P.A. .418 The state charged a law firm and several of its
employees with filing false or incomplete insurance claims. The state
claimed that the attorneys failed to reveal "medical records or statements

409. Id. at 206.
410. Id. at 205.
411. Id.
412. Id.at 206.
413. Hoskins, 702 So. 2d at 206.
414. Id. at 211 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (quoting Rule 3.290 of the FloridaRules of
Criminal Procedure).
415. Id. at 212.
416. Id.
417. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.234 (1987).
418. 698 So. 2d 533, 539 (Fla. 1997).
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that were unfavorable to the claim." 419 The relevant statute provided that one
who prepares written statements in connection with an insurance claim that
"contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information ...material to
such claim" is guilty of a felony. 420 The statute also provided that an
attorney who assists in such a claim is guilty of a felony as well.421 The
court found use of the term "incomplete" in the statute unconstitutionally
vague as applied to attorneys in the representation of their clients. 422 The
court pointed out the special role that attorneys serve and the nature of their
obligations to clients, in stating that "[b]ecause attorneys, pursuant to statute,
case law, procedural rules, and rules of professional regulation, are
customarily required to withhold certain types of information throughout the
representation of a client, the term 'incomplete' without more does not give
attorneys an ascertainable standard of guilt by which to measure their
conduct." 423
The court disagreed with the state's argument that the specific intent
portion of the statute, coupled with the term "incomplete," sufficiently put
attorneys on notice of the behavior penalized by the statute, concluding that
the attorneys "were under no clear duty to disclose the information they
allegedly withheld." 424
An attorney may not assist in the unlicensed practice of law.4 s The
Supreme Court of Florida enjoined an individual and his business from the
practice of law where the individual and his business prepared, among other
things, a dissolution complaint without using a form approved by the
supreme court, prepared bankruptcy petitions, gave legal advice reparding
bankruptcy, and put his name in an "Attorney" slot on petitions.
The
referee's report, adopted by the Supreme Court, found that preparing the
complaint and drafting a letter for the complainant "would be the unlicensed
practice of law even if an attorney had drafted the complaint as Respondent
Davide would have been the conduit for obtaining and relaying the

419. Id. at 536.
420. Id. at 535-36 n.9 (citing FLA. STAT. § 817.234(1) (1987)).
421. Id. at 536 n.10 (citing FLA. STAT. § 817.43(3) (1987)).
422. Id. at 533.
423. Marks, 698 So. 2d at 537.
424. Id. at 539.
425. RPC 4-5.5(b) provides that: "A lawyer shall not... assist a person who is not a
member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of
law." RPC 4-5.5(b).
426. Florida Bar v. Davide, 702 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1997).
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information, without the client ever having spoken with the attorney.,,427
Most notably, however, the court found that the use of the name "Florida
Law Center, Inc.," and the advertising of that name, constituted the
unlicensed practice of law since "the use of the name is misleading and gives
the public the expectation that Florida Law Center, Inc. [sic] has expertise in
the field of law.' 428 The court then enjoined the respondent from use of the
name or any similar name from which the public could infer that the
business offered legal services. 4 2 9
Not only may a lawyer not engage in the unlicensed practice of law, but
a lawyer may not assist in the unlicensed practice of law.430 The court
disbarred an attorney without leave to reapply for five years when he
engaged in the practice of law after resigning from The Florida Bar .4 3 1 The
attorney, after resignation, undertook a two and one-half year litigation in
county court on behalf of his son, who had reached majority and was
engaged in a dispute with his insurance company over an auto accident. 432
Although the court noted a lack of selfish motive in the representation,
having received no payment for the representation, the court found that he
"intentionally violated this Court's order granting his resignation from the
Bar... and this misconduct caused injury to the legal system and the
profession.' ' 3 The court therefore found an appropriate sanction to be
disbarment without leave to reapply for readmission for five years.434
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FLORIDA BAR AND THE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM

This section focuses on attorneys' relationship to The Florida Bar and
the grievance process. The section reports on cases which determine the
effect of the grievance process on other proceedings. Grievance cases that
are not easily defined by the relationships that attorneys have with clients,
the court, or third parties are also analyzed. Finally, this section discusses

427. Id. at 184. See Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-6 (1988) for a
discussion of the ethical considerations involved in having nonlawyer employees gather
information for an attorney.
428. Davide,702 So. 2d at 184-85.
429. Id. at 185.
430. RPC 4-5.5(a) provides that: "A lawyer shall not.., practice law in a jurisdiction
where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction." RPC 45.5(a).
431. Florida Bar v. Weisser, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S269, S271 (May 14, 1998).
432. Id. at S269.
433. Id. at S270.
434. Id. at S271.
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significant changes to the Rules Regulating The FloridaBar and the'Rules of
the FloridaBoardof Bar Examiners.
The Supreme Court of Florida decided that a complainant in a
grievance proceeding enjoys absolute immunity from a defamation claim by
the respondent attorney for all statements made privately within the
grievance process. 435 In Tobkin v. Jarboe,436 the Jarboes, clients of a Florida
attorney, filed complaints about his conduct.4 37 The Florida Bar Grievance
Committee unanimously found no probable cause for the complaint and
dismissed it. 438 The attorney then filed a defamation claim against the
Jarboes which was based upon their complaint to the Bar.439 The trial court
dismissed the claim, and under a theory of absolute immunity, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed. 44 0 The Supreme Court of Florida upheld
the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, finding that "Bar
complainants are protected by an absolute privilege in so far as the
complainant makes no public announcement of the complaint outside of the
grievance process, thus allowing the grievance procedure to run its natural
course. ' 441 The court dismissed Tobkin's argument that, in opening up the
grievance process to the public in 1990, the court also afforded a
complainant qualified immunity as442opposed to the absolute immunity
previously enjoyed by complainants.
The court recognized public policy
against the "chilling" effect on complainants if they did not have absolute
immunity in filing a complaint. 443 Justice Wells dissented, noting that the
Florida Bar Disciplinary Review Commission that recommended opening up
the grievance process also recommended only qualified immunity from
defamation claims. 444 In his argument for qualified immunity, Justice Wells
noted the following:
[Mialicious grievance filings are actually a fact of the present
practice of law. Such filings can be and have been used as tactical
weapons against attorneys to accomplish purposes that have
nothing to do with violation of the rules of professional conduct.
Attorneys should not be defenseless against this tactic nor should
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. 1998).
Id.
at 975.
Id. at 976.
Id.
Id.
Tobkin, 710 So. 2d at 976.
Id.
Id. at 976-77.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 978 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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the grievance process be freely available to those who employ this
F445
tactic.
Justice Wells also noted that the "public exoneration" that the majority
found to be a "suitable remedy for any negative effects created" by a
baseless complaint "ignores the reality" of the effect a complaint can have
on the life and career of the lawyer complained about. 446
An attorney also has certain rights during the grievance process. The
Third District Court of Appeal found in State v. Spiegel" 7 that an attorney's
statements during the course of a Florida Bar investigation did not waive 448
his
Fifth Amendment privilege during a subsequent criminal prosecution.
During the course of their divorce, the attorney's wife, also a lawyer, filed a
bar complaint against him. 449 A member of the Florida Bar Grievance
Committee interviewed Spiegel. At the time of the interview, both the
Grievance Committee member and Spiegel believed that the Rules of the
Florida Bar compelled Spiegel to answer the questions posed.45° The wife
filed for a domestic violence injunction against Spiegel, and later accused
him of violating the injunction. 45 The Grievance Committee then held a
hearing, at which Spiegel asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. Spiegel
then sought the suppression of his earlier statements made to the Grievance
Committee member in his criminal case.452 The court granted the motion to
suppress and certified the question to the Third District Court of Appeal.453
Citing to the public interest, the Third District Court of Appeal found that
not invoking the privilege in a grievance proceeding did not waive the
privilege for the purpose of other proceedings in Spiegel's case:
Primarily, we are concerned that a ruling allowing such statements
to be admissible would interfere with the Bar's truth-seeking and
disciplinary functions.
Bar Grievance proceedings play an
important role in protecting the public from improper professional
conduct by attorneys. In order to carry out this important function,
grievance committee members must be able to conduct meaningful
investigations to ascertain all facts relating to the grievance.
Requiring an attorney to plead the Fifth as soon as possible in order
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Tobkin, 710 So. 2d at 978.
Id.
710 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 15.
Spiegel, 710 So. 2d at 15.
Id. at 16.
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to preserve the privilege would directly conflict with the Bar
Grievance committee's truth-seeking function.45

Since the results can be so severe, it is appropriate to safeguard
attorneys' constitutional rights within the grievance process. The Supreme
Court of Florida disbarred an attorney for a felony conviction in FloridaBar
v. Grief.455 The attorney was convicted in federal court of filing documents
in immigration cases that the attorney knew to be false.4 56 The referee
recommended a three-year suspension due to mitigation established during
the hearing.4 57 The court, in disbarring the attorney, affirmed its sposition
that a felony conviction does not automatically lead to disbarment.45 In this
instance, however, the court found a pattern of misconduct in the filing of
false documents, which warranted disbarment.4 59
Not only may an attorney not violate the law, an attorney may not
violate a court order. In Florida Bar v. Gersten,40 the Supreme Court of
Florida suspended an attorney indefinitely for refusing to comply with a
court order that he answer questions of the state attorney's office. 46 1 The
state granted the attorney immunity from testifying regarding the reported
theft of his car.462 When the attorney refused to testify, the trial court
entered a civil contempt order. 463 The attorney exhausted the appellate
process and maintained his silence. 464 When the trial court ordered him
jailed, the attorney refused to report and went to Australia. 46 5 Gersten
claimed that refusal to testify is permitted under RPC 4-3.4(c), which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under
the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that
no valid obligation exists." 6 The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that,
under such a reading of the rule, any attorney could evade discipline for
violating a court order "indefinitely by asserting a subjective belief that no
valid obligation exists. Such a result invites disrespect for the judicial
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Id. at 17.
701 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id. at 556-57.
Id.
707 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at714.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
Gersten,707 So. 2d at 712.
Id. (quoting RPC 4-3.4(c)).
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system." 467 The court then suspended Gersten indefinitely until he testified
under the court
order and for one year following his compliance with the
468
court order.
The supreme court disciplined several attorneys for trust accounts
469
violations during the year.
The court suspended an attorney for one year
for misappropriating client funds in the settlement of a claim.470 The
attorney settled a claim in a products liability matter, which would be
divided between the client, the attorney, and the client's health care
providers.4 7' The attorney deposited the settlement check and wrote a check
to the client on the agreed upon amount, without sending a closing
statement.47 2 The attorney kept money to pay the health care providers, but
used the money for his own purposes instead. The client filed a complaint
after being contacted by the health care providers for payment. 473 In another
case, the court suspended an attorney474for ninety days for having fifty-nine
checks returned for insufficient funds.
The attorney indicated that he was
currently being treated for a substance abuse problem and had ceased the
practice of law. The court placed the attorney on probation for three years
with the conditions that the attorney hire a certified public accountant to
report to The Florida Bar on the attorney's trust and operating accounts, that
he be subject to random drug testing, and that he remain on under contract to
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Krasnove, 697 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 1209-10.
Id. at 1209.
Id. See subdivision (0(5) of RPC 4-1.5, which provides:
In the event there is a recovery, upon the conclusion of the
representation, the lawyer shall prepare a closing statement reflecting an
itemization of all costs and expenses, together with the amount of fee
received by each participating lawyer or law firm. A copy of the closing
statement shall be executed by all participating lawyers, as well as the client,
and each shall receive a copy. Each participating lawyer shall retain a copy of
the written fee contract and closing statement for 6 years after execution of
the closing statement. Any contingent fee contract and closing statement
shall be available for inspection at reasonable times by the client, by any
other person upon judicial order, or by the appropriate disciplinary agency.
RPC 4-1.5(0(5).
473. Krasnove, 697 So. 2d at 1209. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.15 provides that "[a]
lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, funds and property of
clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation." RPC 4-1.15(a). Subdivision (a) of RPC 5-1.1 provides that "[m]oney or
other property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose, including advances for costs and
expenses, is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose." RPC 5-1.1(a).
474. Florida Bar v. Valladares, 698 So. 2d 823, 824-25 (Fla. 1997).
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Florida Lawyer's Assistance, Inc. 475 Finally, the court suspended another
attorney for ninety days for trust account violations which were similar to
those for which the attorney was previously placed on probation. 476 The
attorney was found to have collected into and disbursed from his trust
account during his period of suspension and to have commingled client
funds with personal funds.477
Often, complaints filed against attorneys alleging trust account
violations also contain other allegations as well. In Florida Bar v.
Pelligrini,478 The Florida Bar accused an attorney of charging an excessive
fee as well as misappropriating client funds. 479 Pelligrini represented a client
in a personal injury matter and filed a complaint a week after the settlement
480
check was mailed (one day before the client signed the release).
An
answer was never filed. 481 Nevertheless, Pelligrini collected 40% of the fee,
in violation of RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i)(a)(1). 482 After upholding the referee's
findings of the trust account and excessive fee violations, the court
483
suspended Pelligrini for three years.
As is usual, attorneys were disciplined this year for neglect of their
clients' matters. The Supreme Court of Florida suspended an attorney for
thirty days for lack of diligence when the attorney requested
484 three extensions
of time in a criminal appeal and then failed to file a brief. In FloridaBar
v. Kassier,485 the court suspended an attorney for one year and placed him on
probation for three years for violations including neglect and trust account
486
violations.
The attorney accepted a retainer from a client to represent her
in a contract matter, did nothing on her case, did not return her retainer, and
487
488
did not refer her to another lawyer.
Finally, in FloridaBar v. Nowacki,
the court suspended an attorney for ninety-one days in a neglect case in
475. Id. at 825.
476. Florida Bar v. Pipkins, 708 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 1998).

477. Id. at 954.
478. 714 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1998).

479. Id. at 450.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. See also RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i)(a)(1), which provides for 33 1/3% of a
recovery up to $1 million which is made prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
483. Pelligrini,714 So. 2d at 453.
484. Florida Bar v. Nesmith, 707 So. 2d 331, 332-33 (Fla. 1998). See RPC 4-1.3,
which requires that an attorney act with diligence relating to client matters. RPC 4-1.3.
485. 711 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1998).
486. Id. at 517.
487. Id. at 516.

488. 697 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1997).
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which the court also found the attorney guilty of dishonesty 489 and failure to
supervise an associate of her firm. 4 9 In addition to chiding the attorney's
neglect of client matters, the court condemned her "wholesale delegation of
her caseload to a new associate., 491 The court, in suspending the attorney
for ninety-one days, noted that "[t]his case involves a persistent pattern of
3
client neglect and mismanagement by the respondent."
Competence is another area in which courts may discipline attorneys.
An attorney who repeatedly failed to follow the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure and the FloridaRules of Appellate Procedurereceived a ninetyone day suspension in Florida Bar v. Solomon.494 The Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed The Florida Bar's arument that "actual harm or prejudice is
not an element of incompetence or lack of diligence under the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar," although they noted that Solomon's numerous
errors in his cases must have affected the clients. 495 The supreme court also
disciplined an attorney for incompetence, among other violations, in the case
of Florida Bar v. Boland.4 96 A client hired the attorney to obtain a
restraining order against the client's husband and to transfer a custody case
to Florida. The client stated that, after the court awarded the husband
custody in the other jurisdiction and the court ordered the client to turn the
children over to the sheriff, attorney Boland advised the client to remove the
children from the jurisdiction while Boland dealt with the matter.497 He also
advised others to deny knowledge of the whereabouts of the children. The
court stated that "[u]pon becoming her lawyer, Boland was charged with
representing his client competently, which would include informing his
client of the legal consequences of her behavior, notifying her of the various
proceedings in the case, and giving her competent legal advice. 4 98
An attorney must also avoid representations involving conflicts of
interest. The court found a clear conflict of interest in Florida Bar v.
Wilson.499 Wilson represented a couple in a declaratory action to share
lottery winnings of the wife.500 He then represented them in additional
489. Id. at 833. See RPC 4-8.4(c).
490. Nowacki, 697 So. 2d at 831. See RPC 4-5.1(b).
491. Nowacki, 697 So. 2d at 831.
492. Id. at 833.
493. RPC 4-1.1 mandates that: "A lawyer provide.., competent representation to a
client." RPC 4-1.1.
494. 711 So. 2d 1141, 1143-47 (Fla. 1998).
495. Id. at 1146 (citing Florida Bar v. Littman, 612 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1993)).
496. 702 So. 2d 229, 232 (Fla. 1997).
497. Id. at 229.
498. Id. at 232.
499. 714 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1998).
500. Id. at 382.
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matters involving their home.5 0' Some time later, the husband requested that
Wilson represent him in a dissolution matter, which Wilson declined.50 2 The
husband filed a dissolution action with the representation of another
lawyer. 3 Wilson then represented the wife in the dissolution matter and in
an action to set aside the declaratory judgment regarding the lottery
winnings. 4 After the court disqualified him in an oral hearing, Wilson then
filed a motion to recuse the judge, as well as a motion for rehearing on the
disqualification.
In addition to agreeing with the referee's finding of a
"clear conflict of interest in violation of rule 4-1.9,"0 6 the court also found
that Wilson had violated RPC 4-8.4(d), 507 since he continued the
representation by filing the motion to recuse after the court disqualified him
from the representation, and suspended him for one year.508
Violation of the attorney advertising rules may also result in discipline,
as evidenced by FloridaBar v. Greenspan.59 The attorney failed to file a
yellow page advertisement for review with The Florida Bar.5 10 Not only did
the attorney refuse to file the advertisement, but he also failed to respond to
the Bar's inquiries regarding both the filing and the investigation of the

501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Wilson, 714 So. 2d at 382.
505. Id.

506. Id. See RPC 4-1.9, which provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or

when the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9.
507. Wilson, 714 So. 2d at 382-83. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4 provides, in
pertinent part, that "A lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct in connection with the practice
of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." RPC 4-8.4(d).
508. Wilson, 714 So. 2d at 384.
509. 708 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1998).
510. Id. at 926-27. See Subdivision (b)of RPC 4-7.5 which requires that an attorney
file any nonexempt advertisement for review with the standing committee on advertising. RPC

4-7.5(b).
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complaint filed by the Bar.51' The Supreme Court of Florida5ublicly
reprimanded the attorney and placed him on probation for one year.
The Supreme Court of Florida's authority over attorneys goes beyond
discipline. The supreme court affirmed its ability to place an attorney on the
inactive list over the attorney's objections in Florida Bar v. Arthur.' 3 The
Florida Bar requested that the attorney undergo an evaluation by Florida
Lawyers Assistance, Inc., regarding her competency after she was
involuntarily hospitalized and medicated for "expressing paranoid
ideations. 5
After the attorney refused the request, the Grievance
Committee held a hearing, determined that she was incompetent to practice,
and directed the Bar to request that the court place the attorney on the
inactive list.515 The court appointed a referee, who ordered the attorney to
undergo a mental evaluation.
When she refused, the court placed her on
the inactive list.5 17 Relying on RPC 3-7.13, 518 the court found that although
there was no proof of any misconduct of the attorney, her refusal to undergo
psychiatric evaluation ordered by the referee warranted her placement on the
inactive list.519
Attorneys and judges have an obligation under the Rules of
ProfessionalConduct to report the violations of the rules by others. 52 In 5-

511. Greenspan, 708 So. 2d at 927.
512. Id. at 928.
513. 22 Fla. L. Weekly S551, S551-52 (Sept. 4, 1997).
514. Id. at S551.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Section (a) of RPC 3-7.13 permits an attorney who has been found incompetent to
practice law to be placed on the inactive list even without proof of misconduct. RPC 3-

7.13(a).
519. Arthur, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S552.
520. RPC 4-8.3 provides:
(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform
the appropriate professional authority.
(b) Reporting Misconduct of Judges. A lawyer having knowledge that
a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that
raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform
the appropriate authority.
(c) Confidences Preserved. This rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-8.3.
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H Corp. v. Padovano,521 the supreme court held that reporting professional
misconduct does not give cause to disqualify a judge.
The First District
Court of Appeal reported an attorney for using expletives and specious
argument in a motion for rehearing. 28 The complaint was dismissed for no
probable cause. 524 The attorney then came before the court in a related
appeal, and moved for disqualification because of the prior referral to The
Florida Bar.52 The supreme court found that Florida judges have a duty to
report unprofessional conduct under RPC 4-8.3, and ruled that the discharge
of that obligation did not give rise to good grounds for disqualification. 526 A
finding of good cause for disqualification would invite attorneys to forum
shop by misbehaving
in court, then disqualify judges who reported the
52
conduct to the Bar.
The Supreme Court of Florida also regulates the activities of The
Florida Bar as an organization. In FloridaBar v. Schwarz,528 the supreme
court affirmed that The Florida Bar's activity regarding lobbying is
restricted. 29 A member of The Florida Bar sought to enjoin it from lobbying
in association with the Florida Lawyers Association for the Maintenance of
Excellence, Inc. ("FLAME").530 Schwarz claimed that employees of the Bar
organize and work for FLAME in violation of case law and rules which
restrict the Bar's activity regarding legislative action. 31 The court found
that although the Bar enters contracts with FLAME to provide administrative
services, and that employees of the Bar act as agents to hold money
contributed to FLAME, such activity does not constitute impermissible
lobbying activity.532 In so deciding, the court pointed out that contributions
to FLAME are voluntary, unlike mandatory membership fees to the Bar, and
that the Bar has no control over actions taken by FLAME. 33

521. 708 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1997).
522. Id. at 246-47.
523. Id. at 245.

524. Id.
525. Id.
526. 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246.

527. Id. at 247.
528. 708 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1998).

529. Id.
530. Id.

531. Id. (citing The Florida Bar re Schwarz, 552 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1989) and RPC 2-9.3
(containing provisions for a Florida Bar member to receive a refund after timely objection to a
legislative position taken by the Bar)).
532. Id. at 589-90.
533. Schwarz, 708 So. 2d at 589.
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In addition to its responsibilities in discipline, the Supreme Court of
Florida also made several changes to the Rules Regulating The FloridaBar.
Among the most important is a change to RPC 1-3.8, dealing with inventory
attorneys. An inventory attorney reviews the files of an attorney who is
suspended, disbarred, or otherwise incapacitated to practice law, and
protects the clients of that attorney.534 The court clarified the role of the
inventory attorney, by adding subsection (c) to rule 1-3.8, which provides
that "[n]othing herein creates an attorney and client, fiduciary, or other
relationship between the inventory attorney and the subject attorney. 5 35 The
court also indicated that "[t]he purpose of appointing an inventory attorney
is to avoid prejudice to clients of the subject attorney.,,536 The supreme court
also approved a change to the rules which permits resolution of problems
537
between attorneys and clients without resort to grievance proceedings.
The Florida Bar proposed removal of certain cases from discipline to a
mediation process to resolve client complaints.5 38 Such removal would
occur only if "the public interest is satisfied by the resolution of the private
rights of the parties to the mediation., 539 The court approved the mediation
program, stating that:
The mediation program should benefit the public by providing an
alternative means to promptly and efficiently resolve grievances
filed against members of the Bar. This Court commends The
Florida Bar Board of Governors for their efforts in encouraging
alternative dispute resolution methods
as a means to enhance the
54
0
process.
grievance
the
of
efficacy
The Supreme Court of Florida also made changes to the rules regulating
admissions to The Florida Bar, mainly codifying existing policy of the
Florida Board of Bar Examiners.5 41 However, the changes also include
shortening the time period for response to a Board inquiry from 120 to
ninety days and "raising the passing score on the [Multistate Professional

534. RPC 1-3.8.
535. Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar., 697 So. 2d
115, 119-20 (Fla. 1997).
536. Id. at 120.
537. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar - Florida Bar Grievance
Mediation Program, 717 So. 2d 498,498 (Fla. 1998).
538. Id.
539. Id. (quoting RPC 3-8.1(d)).
540. Id. at 499.
541. Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the
Bar, 712 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1998).

1998]

Chinaris/ Tarbert

227

Responsibility Examination]. '*542 Notably, the court did not amend RPC 413 to allow law students to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination, since the matter is 5under
review by The Florida Supreme Court
43
Commission on Professionalism.
VI. CONCLUSION

Florida authorities addressed a wide range of professional responsibility
issues in 1998. Practicing lawyers can look to civil cases, criminal cases,
ethics opinions, and amendments to rules in order to understand the
changing scope of their obligations toward each other, clients, third parties,
and the judicial system of which they are an integral part. With such a wide
range of sources generating important decisions that affect the practice of
law, it can truly be said that we have moved beyond a concern for only the
black letter rules into an arena where activities of bar members are governed
by the wider, more encompassing "law of lawyering."

542. Id. at 766.
543. Id. at 767.

